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The Imperative of Managing a Multi-Religious Society
.. a nation based on one race, one language and one religion,
when its people are multi-racial, is one doomed for destruction'
- Law Minister E. W. Barker, 1965
The governors of a multi-ethnic, multi-religious state which is
based on political authority derived from secular laws, rather than
theocratic mandate, are aware of the paradoxical quality of Religion
as a force for peace and conflict. Indeed, the root word re (to bind)
legare (what is broken) suggests that Religion is something which is
redemptive in its healing quality. However, pragmatism informed by
history reveals the need to maintain ethnic and religious cohesion as
religious conflicts can tear plural societies apart. Religion is too
potent a force to disregard or attempt to coercively eliminate, in a
manner reminiscent of totalitarian states where the Hegelian or
Communist state deifies itself as the source of ultimate authority and
demands allegiance from citizens. Religion or irreligion is a strong
source of identity and given the mutual exclusivity of theistic and
anti-theistic worldviews, every society grapples with the question of
how to agree to disagree and live together in peace in this lifetime.
Ph.D. (Cambridge); LLM (Harvard Law School); BA (Oxford) (Hons); Barrister (Gray's
Inn, UK), Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore. This
article is a revised version of a paper presented at the 8"' International Seminar on
"Democracy and Human Rights in Multi-Ethnic Societies", organized by the Institute for
Strengthening Democracy in Bosnia, Konjic, Bosnia-Herzegovina, July 11-15, 2005.
1. 24 Singapore Parliamentary Debates 22 December 1965 at 429.
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What norms, institutions and ethos best secure the pacific co-
existence of distinct religious and ethnic groups within a society which
is committed to democratic pluralism?
This article seeks to investigate this question within the context
of the experiment undertaken by Singapore to manage religious
freedom and preserve social harmony within a multi-ethnic secular
state which practices a 'managed' or 'soft authoritarian' form of
corporatist democracy.2 As a cautionary tale, former Prime Minister
Goh Chok Tong drew an interesting parallel between Singapore and
the former Yugoslavia to underscore the fragility of state cohesion in
the face of separatist pulls fuelled by religious and ethnic differences.
He noted that "Singapore is not yet a nation, it is only a state, a
sovereign entity... We do not all speak the same language. Nor do
we share the same religion and customs. We have different
ancestors.' 3  Similarly, he noted of the Yugoslavia "cobbled
together"4 by Tito after World War Two that, "There was never a
Yugoslavia nation. The break-up of the former Yugoslavia illustrates
that a nation is not just a collection of peoples under a common
constitutional framework."5
Thus, in non-homogenous nations like Singapore and
Yugoslavia, preserving social cohesion is central to state survivability
as Yugoslavia imploded after only 45 years as "Belgrade could not
hold the different tribes together."6 Singapore, which has been an
independent republic for 40 years, was "too small to break up into
two or three separate countries. But racial riots can tear the country
apart."7 The official state policy towards managing the multi-cultural
composition of Singapore is that it will never be a melting pot, as the
different ethnic groups want to preserve their distinct traits in terms
of customs, culture, language, and in some cases where ethnicity and
religion are closely correlated, faith. Singapore's strategy to "create
the Singapore tribe" 8 has been, some argue artificially, to construct a
unifying national identity, through an emphasis on a common
2. See generally Li-ann Thio, 'Lex Rex or Rex Lex: Competing Conceptions of the
Rule of Law in Singapore' 20 UCLA Pacific Basin L.J. 1 (2002).
3. Speech by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong on Singapore 21 Debate in Parliament
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citizenship and through promulgating a set of "shared values." 9
Furthermore, there has been an attempt to manage ethnic relations
by recognizing a "common area" where all ethnic groups interacted,
with English as the common language in a setting with equal
opportunities for all. Outside this, each community has a "separate
area" 10wherein to retain and speak its own language and express its
cultural identity, noting that this "practical approach of nation-
building whereby every community has two playing fields has given us
multi-racial harmony."'1  Although ethnic and religious tensions
persist, the relative peace (or absence of overt religious disharmony)
that Singapore has enjoyed since Independence has earned it the title
of being the "Switzerland of the East."'2
This article focuses on 3 themes oriented towards examining how
Caesar relates to God: through state attempts to control, co-opt and
co-operate with Religion. In so doing, it demonstrates the ambivalent
attitude of the state towards Religion and the contours of religious
freedom, pluralism and harmony within the Singapore model. Part I
sets out the historical background and constitutional framework
which establishes Singapore's model of accommodative secularism
and religious pluralism. Part II engages the themes of the extent to
which the state seeks to control, co-opt and co-operate with Religion
and the religious communities, contextualizing the discussion with
specific illustrative examples. It first discusses the state's perception
of religion as 'constructive' to the extent that the state seeks to co-opt
and co-operate with religions or religious groups. In relation to co-
optation, this theme is explored through examining the botched
religious studies scheme which the government introduced to public
schools in an attempt to shore up national values in the 1980s. With
respect to co-operation, it examines what the state envisages to be the
9. Shared Values White Paper (Singapore National Printers: Cmd 1 of 1991). This
paper, a statement of national values, has been criticized by some as a top-down
imposition of Neo-Confucianist communitarian values which emphasis political stability,
racial and religious harmony and respect rather than distrust for authorities, which tends
to buttress the status quo. The five declared values are: (i) nation before community and
society above self; (ii) family as the basic unit of society; (iii) regard and community
support for the individual; (iv) consensus instead of contention and (v) racial and religious
harmony. See generally In Search of Singapore's National Values, Jon TS Quah ed.
(Singapore: Times Academic Press, for Institute of Policy Studies, 1990).
10. Id.
11. Speech by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong on Singapore 21, 5 May 1999, supra,
note 3.
12. 'Geneva latest European city to attract S'pore investors', Straits Times
(Singapore) 22 Oct 1993 at 44.
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permissible realms of religious activity in the public sphere. It
considers which matters the state will enter into co-operative ventures
with, vis-a-vis religious groups. The discussion then turns to state
perceptions of religion as negative or threatening and attempts to
control religious activity and expression. The perceived and actual
threats to social order posed by Religion and the formal legal and
informal control mechanisms employed by the State are examined.
These threats include fears with respect to religious extremism and
terrorism, aggressive proselytization and government insecurity
towards perceived religious challenges to its political authority or
controversial national policies. The conflictive dimension of Religion
must be balanced against the crucial role it plays in buttressing the
peace architecture of the state, particularly with respect to its
socializing function within faith communities. Religion is also
foundational to maintaining a democratic society and protecting
group and individual autonomy which sustains civil society and curbs
the undue expansion of state power. Notably, the state 'privatizes'
Religion to some extent through the recognition of communal
religious authority and exempts the application of general laws to
certain religious and personal laws. This is examined in light of the
Administration of Muslim Law Act13 , which imports a degree of
limited legal pluralism into the common law framework, a legacy of
British colonialism. Part III draws conclusions from these case
studies and seeks to provide insights into the role of religion in public
life and how 'religion' and 'politics' is differentiated and treated
within the secular political order in Singapore.
I. Background and Context to the Singapore Model of
"Accommodative Secularism"
A. The Social Context, Religious/Race Riots and the Psychic Scars of a
Secular State with a Religious Society'
(i) Grappling with Religious and Ethnic Diversity:
A Multi Religious Society within a Quasi Secular State
Religious and ethnic diversity is a fact in Singapore, an island
city-state centrally situated in the Malay Archipelago where
surrounding countries like Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei have
13. Administration of Muslim Act, (Cap 3), 1999 Revised Edition.
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Muslim-majority populations. Indeed, a former Indonesian President
derogatorily called Chinese-majority Singapore "a red dot in a sea of
green,"" given its central location within a Malay region.
Singapore was founded and colonised in 1819 as a British Free
Port and seceded from the Federation of Malaya on August 9, 1965 to
become an independent republic, organized along the lines of the
Westminster model of parliamentary government. During the period
of colonial tutelage, it attracted Chinese immigrants and other ethnic
groups including the Arabs, Parsees and Armenians, and imported
Indian labour. These ethnic groups were segregated by residence and
language during the colonial era, although in 1956, the educational
policy was modified to require bilingualism in the various language
schools, where students were taught their mother tongue and English,
which remains the lingua franca today."
Today, all major world religions are represented in Singapore
among Singapore's population which numbers around 4.2 million.
16
These include Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism and
various Catholic and Protestant Christian denominations. Despite
increasing urbanisation and industrialisation which tends to signal the
decline of religion, Clammer has noted an unconventional trend of
growing levels of religious piety, 7 with some 86% of Singaporeans
professing a religious faith. 8  The religious breakdown of the
population has been reported as the following: Buddhists & Taoists
(51%); Muslims (15%); Christians (15%); Hindus (4%); No Religion
(13%) and Other Religions (2%)."
14. Former Indonesian President BJ Habibie made this derogatory reference:
'President unhappy with Singapore, says AWSJ', Straits Time (Singapore), 5 Aug 1998 at
16.
15. Art 153A of the Republic of Singapore Constitution ["Singapore Constitution"]
provides that Malay, Mandarin, Tamil and English shall be the 4 official languages in
Singapore and clause 2 states: "The national language shall be the Malay language and
shall be in the Roman script". Full text of the constitution is available online at
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/
16. Singapore Statistics, Mid Year Population Estimate (2004): available online at
http://www.singstat.gov.sg/keystats/annual/indicators.html.
17. John Clammer, 'Religion and Society in Singapore: Ethnicity, Identity and Social
Change' in Society, Culture and Patterns of Behaviour, Seyschab, Sievers & Szynkiewicz
eds (Germany: Horleman Verlag Unkel / Rhein und Bad Honnef, 1990) 157-182 at 180.
18. Lydia Lim & Aaron Lowe, 'Nation of believers: Modernisation and economic
development have done little to dent Singaporeans' faith in God, according to a key
finding of a recent Straits Times survey', Straits Times (Singapore) 16 July 2005, Saturday
Special Report (available on LEXIS).
19. Population Census (2000), David Chan, Attitude on Race and Religion in
Singapore: (MCDS, 2003) 19.Population Census (2000), David Chan, Attitude on Race and
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To some extent, there is a close identification of ethnic culture
and religious affiliation within this multi-ethnic city state. The ethnic
composition of the Singapore population is about 77% Chinese, 14%
Malay, 7.4% Indian, the remaining citizenry being classified as
"others." 20 The Constitution recognises the "special position" of the
Malays as the indigenous people. While they do not enjoy
constitutionally guaranteed group rights, the government is obliged to
promote and protect their interests, including their religion.2 While
99.4% of Malays are Muslims (mainly of the Shafli school) 22 the
stereotypical image is that the Chinese practise Buddhism and
Taoism and that Indians are Hindu, unless otherwise stated.
Christianity alone transcends the ethnic boundary. Given that the
identity of certain groups is shaped by a conflation of religious and
ethnic identity, inter-group conflict can be precipitated by both
religious and racial factors.23
This has been historically borne out by the racial riots between
the Chinese and Malays in the 1950s and 1960s.24 These bore religious
overtones, even if their chief impetus was ethnic chauvinism, and
have scarred the national psyche since their occurrence in the early
Religion in Singapore: (MCDS, 2003) http://www.mcds.gov.sg/MCDSFiles/
download/SAS02RR.pdf.
20. See Andreas Ackermann, 'They Give us Categories and We Fill Ourselves In':
Ethnic Thinking in Singapore' 4 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 451-
467 (1997).
21. On the Malay problem in Singapore, see Lily Zubaidah Rahim, The Singapore
Dilemma: The Political and EducationalMmarginality of the Malay community (Malaysia:
Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1998).
22. There are Indian Muslims belonging to the Hanafi School of Law and some Shites
in Singapore.
23. See Trevor Ling, 'Religion' in Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern
Singapore KS Sandhu & Paul Wheatley eds., (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies, 1989) at 692-709.
24. The riots of the 1950s were related to a child custody case concerning a Dutch girl
brought up by a Muslim woman whose Catholic parents sought custody after the World
War II: Re Maria Huberdina Hertorgh [1951] 1 Malayan Law Journal (MUJ) 164. In 1964,
riots broke out between Malays and Chinese during a procession celebrating Prophet
Muhammed's birthday, and again in 1969. Since then, there have been no ethnic / religious
riots on Singapore soil: For details on the race riots, see Mark Hong, 'Singapore's Success
in Creating Racial and Religious Harmony', at 24.The riots of the 1950s were related to a
child custody case concerning a Dutch girl brought up by a Muslim woman whose Catholic
parents sought custody after the World War II: Re Maria Huberdina Hertorgh [1951] 1
Malayan Law Journal (MLJ) 164. In 1964, riots broke out between Malays and Chinese
during a procession celebrating Prophet Muhammed's birthday, and again in 1969. Since
then, there have been no ethnic / religious riots on Singapore soil: For details on the race
riots, see Mark Hong, 'Singapore's Success in Creating Racial and Religious Harmony', at
http://samll.moe.gov.sg/racialharmony/download/Racial-Religious-Harmony-final.pdf
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years of Independence. Consequently, the experiential encounter
with the volatile quality of race and religion has resulted in
permanently entrenching the need to preserve religious harmony as a
dominant motif in political discourse. Indeed, it has been expressly
linked as foundational to a "peaceful, prosperous Singapore., 25 This
statist imperative is presented as one of several "essential conditions
for our survival as one nation., 26 The fragility of religious harmony
and the need for eternal vigilance is underscored by frequent
reference to the originating myth of the precarious state threatened
by ethnic chauvinism, religious conflict and social divisiveness. The
government thus seeks to apply an integrationist approach towards
such matters as education 27 and housing policy,' to promote inter-
racial mixing and prevent isolationism.
B. The Constitutional Establishment of Singapore's Model of Quasi or
Accommodative Secularism
Alone in Southeast Asia, we are a state without
an established church
- Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, 196729
'No single religion can be said to be the dominant
religion, nor is any religion an official religion of
the State because Singapore is strictly secular':
- Home Affairs Minister S Jayakumar
30
25. Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong: "I consider the racial and religious harmony as
the most important bedrock of our society. If there is no harmony, there will be no
peaceful, prosperous Singapore - as simple as that": Straits Times, 24 Feb 1990, quoted in
Vineeta Sinha, 'Theorising 'Talk' about 'Religious Pluralism' and 'Religious Harmony' in
Singapore' Vol. 20 No. 1, Journal of Contemporary Religion 25-40 at 28 (2005).
26. Maintenance of Religious Harmony (MRHA) White Paper, (Singapore National
Printers, Cmd 21 of 1989), para 4. [hereafter, MRHA white paper].
27. Inter-Racial Mixing in Schools, 76 Singapore Parliament Reports, 15 Aug 2003 col.
2465 at cols 2467, 2476.
28. Since 1989, a racial quota which reflects the current racial balance was adopted in
public housing policy. This served to break up ethnic enclaves in Housing Development
Board (HDB) estates, where 80% of Singaporeans live in, by setting specific limits on the
proportion of residents of each race allowed to buy flats in specific neighborhoods. See
Ooi Giok Ling, Sharon Siddique & Soh Kay Cheng, The Management of Ethnic Relations
in Public Housing (Singapore: Times Academic Press for Institute of Policy Studies, 1993).
29. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, addressing a Buddhist Convention: "No
dominance by religious group over others - Lee" Straits Times (Singapore), 5 Jan 1967 at
6.
30. 54 Singapore Parliamentary Report, 22 Feb 1990, Maintenance of Religious
Harmony Bill, col. 1047.
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This section examines the legal framework, constitutional history
and political culture which shape the evolution of Singapore's model
of "accommodative secularism.,
31
(i) Genesis and Exodus: Departure from the Malaysian Model
of Religious Pluralism
An immigrant "nation by accident,"32 Singapore was never meant
to be an independent state: the British colonial authorities planned to
situate the island within the Malaysian Federation, fearing it was too
small to survive on its own.33 From 1963-1965, Singapore was part of
the Federation of Malaysia. This merger failed because of Malay
nationalism and Malay demands for special privileges as bumiputras,
or indigenous peoples, which jarred with the demand by Singapore
governors for a 'Malaysian' Malaysia, meritocracy and equal
treatment for all. While the Malays in Peninsula Malaysia feared that
Singapore, a predominantly Chinese city-state would fall prey to
Communism and become a Cuba south of Malaysia's border, their
fear of Chinese economic dominance ultimately doomed the short-
lived merger.
After peacefully seceding from the Federation of Malaysia in
1965, the issue of nation-building and economic survival was
uppermost in the minds of the ruling People's Action Party (PAP),
which has been in continuous hegemonic control of Singapore since
Independence, currently controlling 82 of 84 elected parliamentary
seats. Consequently, there is a tendency to conflate state and society
and, it must be noted, ministerial statements are accorded quasi-
legislative weight.' 4  The economic and social development of
Singapore was threatened by communism and communalism. Thus,
an authoritarian method of political control was established, through
the heavy centralisation of state power, which rendered diminutive
31. As described by the Court of Appeal in Peter Williams Nappalli v Institute of
Technical Education [1999] 2 Singapore Law Reports (SLR) 569 at 576, para 29.
32. Beatrice S. Frank et al., The Decline of the Rule of Law in Malaysia and Singapore
Part II - Singapore, A Report of the Committee on International Human Rights of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 46 The Record 7 (1991), quoting Minister
S. Jayakumar at 25.
33. Janadas Devan, 'Britain wanted a Malaysia since WWII' Straits Times
(Singapore), June 19 2005 at 24-25.
34. It has been argued that policy papers enjoy quasi-constitutional status insofar as
they conclusively inform constitutional adjudication: Benedict Sheehy, 'Singapore,
"Shared Values" and Law: Non East versus West Constitutional" 34 Hong Kong L.J. 67
(2004).
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the space for civil society, including religious groups, where social
discipline was prioritized over democracy as a prerequisite for
attracting foreign investment. Through restrictive legislation and
policy, the trade unions were emasculated," dissident politicians
silenced through onerous preventive detention laws, and the media
regulated to the point it became a national partner in state-building,
rather than a critical watchdog or 'fourth estate' after the American
model of journalism. 6 The ethnic management policy adopted
combined institutionalised multi-racialism37 with meritocracy, in an
attempt to downplay the early perception of Singapore as a 'Third
China.' Nevertheless Singapore's economic growth from a third to a
first world state in just 40 years has conferred economic and political
legitimacy upon the PAP government.
Singapore's Independence Constitution, which borrowed heavily
from the Malaysian constitution3 8 departed from the Malaysian model
of religious pluralism in various important respects in seeking to
establish a secular rather than a 'confessional' state. Three important
modifications are noteworthy.
First, it omits any confessional statement similar to that
embodied in article 3 of the 1957 Malaysian constitution that "Islam is
the religion of the Federation but other religions may be practiced in
peace and harmony in any part of the Federation., 39 Thus, it has no
official religion, although multi-religiosity is advocated insofar as the
government strives to deal with religions in an equal-handed manner.
While there is no constitutional principle explicitly embracing
secularity, this is apparent from the 1966 Wee Constitutional
35. Anthony Woodiwiss, 'Singapore and the Possibility of Enforceable Benevolence'
in Globalisation, Human Rights and Labour Law in Pacific Asia (UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1998) at 216.
36. For further analysis, see Thio Li-ann, "Pragmatism and Realism do not mean
abdication": A Critical Inquiry into Singapore's Engagement with International Human
Rights Law: 8 Singapore Yearbook of International Law (SYBIL) 41-91 (2004).
37. For example, in the composition of the Group Representation Constituency
(GRC) under article 39A of the Constitution, a team of 4-6 persons run for an electoral
ward, and each team must have a member belonging to a stipulated minority group to
guarantee minority representation. See Thio Li-ann, 'Choosing Representatives:
Singapore does it Her Way' in The People's Representatives: Electoral Systems in the Asia-
Pacific Region, Graham Hassall & Cheryl Saunders eds., (Allen & Unwin, 1997) at 38-59.
38. This was incorporated through the 1965 Republic of Singapore Independence
Act, with modifications. See Kevin YL Tan, The Evolution of Singapore's Modern
Constitution: Developments from 1945 to the Present Day, 1 Singapore Academy of Law
Journal 1, 6-17 (1989).
39. Text of the 1957 Federal Constitution of Malaysia available online at
<http://confinder.richmond.edu/local-malaysia.html>..
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Commission report ' which describes Singapore as a "multi-racial
secular society" and a "democratic secular state." 1 The juridically
non-binding Declaration of Religious Harmony, adopted in 2003,
recently affirmed "the secular nature of our State."42 However, it did
not expand on what secularism, a protean term, entails, as it may
connote many things, from a benevolent to malevolent attitude
towards Religion
However, clearly the understanding of the secular state in the
Singapore context does not connote state hostility towards Religion
of the kind manifested by Communist states.4 '3 Rather, a respectful
attitude towards Religion is preserved as it is considered a "positive
factor" as a source of spiritual strength and moral guidance.4
Further, "the Government should not be antagonistic to the religious
beliefs of the population." 5 Thus secularity does not connote anti-
theism as "Singapore's government is secular, but it is certainly not
atheistic. It is neutral. This is an important principle because all the
major religions of the world are represented here., 46 Thus, within the
context of Singapore, 'secularism' is pragmatic, rather than dogmatic
or doctrinaire, and religious liberty is enjoyed, subject to statist
imperatives. A secular basis for the state was embraced "precisely
because Singaporeans belong to varied and strongly-held religious
faiths."'47  This pragmatic, sensible accommodating approach is
evident in that when it comes to official national meetings such as
those relating to commemorating national disasters like the 1997
Silkair airplane crash in Sumatra8 or the December 2004 Tsunami
40. Appendix D, Kevin YL Tan & Thio Li-ann, Constitutional Law in Malaysia and
Singapore (Asia: Butterworths 1997)
41. See Chapter I, Wee Constitutional Commission report, para 38, id.
42. Feedback Unit, Policy Digest, Issue 12/03 at
http://app.feedback.gov.sg/asp/pol/pol0ldl.asp?id=402. For an analysis, see Thio Li-ann,
'Constitutional 'Soft' Law and the Management of Religious Liberty and Order: The 2003
Declaration on Religious Harmony', Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 414-443 (2004).
43. During the drafting of the Declaration on Religious Harmony, the original phrase
"acknowledging that we are a secular society" attracted strong objections as it falsely
connoted that "we have no religion at all, like the communists": Canon James Wong,
quoted in "Religious code goes beyond keeping peace", Straits Times (Singapore), 16 Oct
2002 at H2.
44. Para 6, MRHA white paper, supra, note 26.
45. Para 5, MRHA, White Paper, supra, note 26.
46. "Government is secular: not atheistic: BG Yeo" Straits Time (Singapore), 8 Oct
1992 at 2.
47. Minister S. Jayakumar 54 Singapore Parliament Reports, 6 Oct 1989 at col 637.
48. Zuraidah Ibrahim, 'The nation mourns', Straits Times (Singapore), 31 Dec 1997 at
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disaster, 9 religious and political leaders stand shoulder to shoulder.
This might be contrasted with the Canadian government's decision to
eliminate all mention of faith and holy words at a national service for
9-11 victims,0 which would be considered an exemplar of religious
intolerance in Singapore.
Thus, the Singapore polity is secular insofar as the Constitution
and legal framework provides that the legitimacy to govern is derived
from democratic elections as "ultimate political authority" rather
than "any divine or ecclesiastical sanction."51  As evidence of this
secularity, Singapore courts such as the Military Court of Appeal will
not entertain 'divine law' arguments as a basis for invalidating secular
laws regulating mandatory military service, as was challenged by a
member of the Jehovah's Witnesses in Pte Chai Tshun Chieh v Chief
Military Prosecutor.1
2
Second, the Singapore Constitution has adopted a more liberal
or expansive definition of religious liberty in article 15(1) which
provides that "Every person has the right to profess and practice his
religion and to propagate it."53 This is distinct from the Malaysian
article 11 which provides that state law may restrict propagation of
other faiths to persons professing Islam.4 However, such an anti-
1.
49. Tracy Sua & Sharlene Tan, 'Thousands gather to pray for tsunami victims', Straits
Times (Singapore) 31 Jan 2005 (available on LEXIS).
50. 2001-JAN-3: 'Canada: Anglican Primate concerned about role of religion'.
Requests to the federal government for an appropriate protocol for a 'prayerful interfaith
response to the terrorist attacks' were ignored when the government decided to exclude
any religious participation in the memorial service for the 9-11 terrorist attack on
Parliament Hill in Ottawa: available at http://www.religioustolerance.org/news-02jan.htm
<visited 25 May 2005>.
51. Para 5, MRHA white paper, supra, note 26. Notably, a proposed sixth value,
"Belief in God", was discarded from the shared values white paper, a statement of the
government's preferred 'communitarian' national ideology as Singapore was a "secular
state"; thus the white paper should be a "secular document" and exclude "religious
values": Shared Values White Paper, supra, note 9 at para. 46.
52. One of the grounds put forward was "that the Bible was a higher law than any
man-made laws and in disobeying the officer's order, he was only obeying the higher of
the two conflicting laws." Pte Chai Tshun Chieh v Chief Military Prosecutor [1998]
SGMCA 3 at para. 13
53. Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999) Revised Edition [hereafter,
'Singapore Constitution'], full text available online at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/
54. Notably, Lee Kuan Yew made a 1963 ministerial statement before the legislative
assembly that after Singapore entered the Federation, it would continue the policy of
religious tolerance and allow the freedom of all religions in Singapore; he declared his
government did not intend "to introduce legislation to control or restrict the propagation
of any religious doctrine or belief..." Statement by the Prime Minister, 'Religious
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propagation clause "singling out a particular religion for special
treatment"55 would be "inappropriate" 56 and "inconsistent" 57 in the
Singapore context, as noted by the 1966 Constitutional Commission
whose mandate was to recommend constitutional safeguards for the
"rights of racial, linguistic and religious minorities."58
Thirdly, building on this, the Singapore Constitution does not
conflate religious with ethnic identity as is done by article 160 of the
Malaysian constitution. This defines "Malay" as "a person who
professes the religion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malay language,
[and] conforms to Malay custom." This has compounded the
problem of murtads or apostates who wish to leave the Muslim faith
in Malaysia, but cannot as the syariah or Islamic religious law
prohibits this and makes apostates liable for fines, imprisonment or
detention in faith rehabilitation centres. 9 Indeed, the Malaysian High
Court has declared that "A Malay under art 160(2) remains in the
Islamic faith until his or her dying days."6 Conversely, in Singapore,
the government recognises that its duty lies in ensuring that "every
citizen is free to choose his own religion., 6' To erect an anti-
propagation clause in favour of one religion is to privilege that
religion, an approach that is contrary to what I have previously
described as Singapore's model of "accommodative secularism"
Freedom in Singapore After Malaysia', Singapore Parliament Report 29 July 1963, col. 261
at 262.
55. Para 38, Wee Commission Report, supra, note 40.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Terms of Reference spelt out by Law Minister EW Barker, Singapore Parliament
Reports, 22 Dec 1965.
59. Ioannis Gatsiounis, 'Malaysia's Muslims have 'no way out', The Washington
Times, 20 Aug 2004, available at <http://www.washtimes.com/world/20040819-111615-
8930r.htm>. While the Malaysian Constitution does not expressly prohibit apostasy from
Islam, apostates face a range of penalties under state law. For example, section 13 of the
Administration of Islamic Law Enactment of Perak provides that apostasy committed by a
Muslim is an offence punishable with either a RM2000 fine or imprisonment for a term of
up to two years. Apostates may also be required to appear at the Kadi's court every month
for 3 years to repent (melafazkan taubat), flogged or detained in faith rehabilitation
centres. See generally Mohamad Imam, 'Freedom of Religion under Federal Constitution
of Malaysia - A Reappraisal [1994] 2 Current Law Journal (CLJ) lvii at page lxxix.
60. Thamby Chik J, Lina Joy v Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah [2004] 2 Malayan Law
Journal (MLJ) 119 at 143, para. 58.
61. Para 5, MRHA white paper, supra, note 26. Also, this is a principle of the 2003
Declaration on Religious Harmony: 'Respect each other's freedom of religion.' Text of
Declaration available at the Ministry for Community Development, Youth and Sports
website at http://www.mcys.gov.sg.
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which seeks to maintain "a sense of equity among religious groups.
62
The Court of Appeal has affirmed that "accommodative secularism" 63
relates to the Constitution's protection of freedom of religion being
premised upon "removing restrictions to one's choice of religious
belief."6  Individual religious choice acts in tandem with treating
religious faiths equally under this model. Thus, religious tolerance
and pluralism requires that the state be agnostic about the veracity of
religious truth claims, confining itself to providing and sustaining a
legal framework within which distinct religious groups can co-exist.
'Secularism' connotes the equal treatment of all religions.
(ii) Principles Underlying the Singapore Model of Religious
Liberty
Thus, Singapore adopts a more 'laissez-faire' attitude towards
religious choice and propagation than Malaysia's more protectionist
approach which accords privileges to Islam, by not officially
recognizing any religion and by appreciating that article 15 of the
Constitution protects religious affiliation as a matter of personal
choice. Following upon that, one is not compelled to pay religious tax
other than for one's own religion: article 15(2).65 Furthermore, the
autonomy of religious institutions in managing their own affairs,
establishing religious or charitable institutions and holding property is
constitutionally guaranteed: article 15(3).'
However, religious freedom is not an absolute right and the
courts have declared that article 15(1) be read with article 15(4) which
does not authorize "any act contrary to any general law relating to
public order, public health or morality." Thus, the state has resorted
to legislation to regulate threats to the public order posed by religious
expression. Notably, the courts applying a pro-communitarian
62. Thio Li-ann, 'The Secular Trumps the Sacred: Constitutional Issues Arising out of
Colin Chan v PP' (1995) Singapore Law Review 26 at 36.
63. Nappalli Peter Williams v Institute of Technical Education [1999] 2 SLR 569 at
576G (Court of Appeal).
64. Id..
65. Art 15(2), Singapore Constitution provides: "(2) No person shall be compelled to
pay any tax the proceeds of which are specially allocated in whole or in part for the
purposes of a religion other than his own."
66. Art 15(3), Singapore Constitution provides that "Every religious group has the
right (a) to manage its own religious affairs; (b) to establish and maintain institutions for
religious or charitable purposes; and
(c) to acquire and own property and hold and administer it in accordance with law."
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approach towards the constitutional adjudication of liberties have
tended to accord great weightage to the state interests. This is
evident from in the High Court decision of Colin Chan v Pp67 a case
where the Court upheld administrative orders de-registering the
Jehovah's Witnesses (JWS) and banning their publications as their
pacifist beliefs were considered a threat to the cornerstone of public
order, the compulsory military service scheme. Chief Justice Yong
noted:
The sovereignty, integrity and unity of Singapore are
undoubtedly the paramount mandate of the Constitution
and anything, including religious beliefs and practices,
which tend to run counter to these objectives must be
restrained.68
Thus, rights are not trumps in the Dworkinian sense of
categorically overriding social interests and responsibilities.69
Restrictions to liberties tend to be construed broadly.
70
(iii) State-Religion Relations: The Government as 'Manager'
and Arbiter of the Boundaries between 'Religion' and
'Politics'
Singapore may be described as a secular state with a religious
society. The relationship between State and Religion in Singapore is
somewhat ambivalent, given that both exert competing demands for
loyalty to Caesar and God. While religion is officially recognised as a
"constructive social force,"71 its destabilzing capacity in precipitating
religious polarisation and conflict within a multi-ethnic, multi-
religious state is recognized. Thus the State views Religion as
something that has to be consciously "managed" and does not give
67. (1994) 3 SLR 662.
68. (1993) 3 SLR 662 at 684.
69. Ronald Dworkin defines individual rights as "political trumps" whereby "a
collective goal is not sufficient justification for denying them what they wish, as
individuals, to have or to do, or not a sufficient justification for imposing some loss or
injury upon them": Taking Rights Seriously (Great Britain: Duckworth, 1977) at xi.
70. See Thio Li-ann, "An i for an I': Singapore's Communitarian Model of
Constitutional Adjudication' 27 Hong Kong Law Journal Part 2 152-186 (1997) and
'Trends in Constitutional Interpretation: Oppugning Ong, Awakening Arumugam'
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 240-290 (1997).
71. Shared Values white paper, supra, note 9 at para. 45.
72. "We.. .cannot assume that religious harmony will persist indefinitely... Conscious
efforts are necessary to maintain it..." para 13, MRHA white paper, supra, note 23. The
Shared Values white paper (1991), supra note 9 at para 17 notes: "We have enjoyed racial
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full rein to the 'free market' approach towards Religion so as to allow
it to "flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of
its dogma., 73  Thus, the government has regularly taken pains to
remind religionists of their responsibilities to the wider community
and to urge religious leaders to practice their faith in a manner
beneficial to the public good.7' Given the mutual exclusivity of
religious beliefs, Minister Lee Hsien Loong in 1990 noted "We have
to find some way to compromise practically what is impossible to
reconcile theologically.,
75
The State regulates Religion through both formal legislative
measures like the 1989 Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act
("MRHA"),76 and informal persuasive means exemplified by the
adoption of a non-binding set of guidelines for religious interaction
embodied in the 2003 Declaration on Religious Harmony ("DRH"). 77
This seeks to persuade and exhorts self-policing and the exercise of
common-sense, rather than coerced norms of behaviour. Ultimately,
the State through the arm of the government views itself as the
manager of racial-religious differences, tasked with ensuring the
peaceful co-existence of distinct ethno-cultural groups by pre-empting
inter-group tensions, acting as the final arbiter on associated disputes.
Although no bright lines exist between 'religion' and 'politics',
the state nevertheless assumes the right to define the boundary line.
On this point, it is important to note that in the absence of a
and religious harmony since Independence. This does not prove that our social fabric is
inherently stronger than other multi-racial societies, or that we are immune to the serious
problems which have afflicted so many of them. It only shows the amount of care which
has gone into tending it and strengthening it." Notably BG Lee stated that religious
harmony is not something that occurs as a matter of course but must be maintained:
"Religious peace must be maintained: Otherwise things will never be the same if conflict
breaks out: BG Lee", Straits Times (Singapore) 20 May 1996 at 3.
73. Zorach v Clauson, 343 U.S. at 313 (US Supreme Court)
74. In a 1966 address to the Tamil Muslim Union, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew said
he hoped Muslim community leaders "would always interpret Islamic doctrine in a way
that would be to the benefit of its followers and the general good of the community. Raj
Vasil, cited in Trevor Ling, supra, note 23 at 94.
75. Straits Times, 31 January 1990, quoted in Vineeta Sinha, supra, note 25 at 28.
76. (Cap 167A), 2001 Revised Edition. For a comment, see Valentine S. Winslow,
'The Separation of Religion and Politics: The Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act'
(1990) 32 Malaya Law Review 327; Kuah Khun Eng, 'Maintaining Ethno-Religious
Harmony in Singapore' Journal of Contemporary Asia, 3 Jan 1998.
77. Ministry of Community Development and Sports Press Release, 'Declaration on
Religious Harmony' 9 July 2003, text of Declaration annexed at
http://www.mcys.gov.sg/MCDSFiles/Press/Articles/press-release-9Jun-final.html <visited 1
Oct 2005>.
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constitutional definition, the Court of Appeal adopted a restrictive
definition of 'Religion' in the leading case of Nappalli Peter Williams
v Institute of Technical Education"8 where it rejected as "wholly
misplaced" the approach taken in other jurisdictions where any belief
or thought "potentially holds religious value" especially and
ironically, irreligious beliefs held with religious fervour. 'Religion', as
judicially defined for the purposes of article 15, relates to "a citizen's
faith in a personal God, sometimes described as a belief in a
supernatural being."7 9  Yong CJ rejected the view that Religion
encompassed a system of belief in one's own country, noting that
"The State commands no supernatural existence in a citizen's
personal belief system."'8 Yong CJ noted that "the secular tenet of
our art 15 is reflected in the secular tone of the pledge and national
anthem", which were practices lacking "religious significance."'"
Thus, the Court distinguished between religious beliefs warranting
article 15 protection and philosophical beliefs which fell beyond its
ambit."' If it were otherwise and Singapore adopted a broad view
towards defining religion, as the American courts have in including
secular humanism as a "sincere and meaningful belief" within its
ambit,8' it might be accused of establishing or imposing Neo-
Confucianism as a 'religion,' given its proclamation as the preferred
78. [1999] 2 SLR 569. Approving the trial judge who opined that the school National
Pledge taking and National Anthem ceremony "is obviously not a religious ceremony".
This eroded any claim that article 16(3) which safeguards a person from being compelled
to take part in any religious ceremony other than his own, was violated: Peter Williams
Nappalli v Institute of Technical Education [1998] SGHC 351, High Court Decision of 22
Oct 1998 at para. 52. Thus, there was no coerced participation in a religious ceremony. If
not, as Yong CJ for the Court of Appeal rhetorically posed at [19991 2 SLR 569, 577A-B
"How can the same Constitution guarantee religious freedom if by asking citizens to
pledge their allegiance to country it is coercing participation in a religious ceremony? This
excruciatingly absurd interpretation cannot have been what was envisaged by the authors
of the Constitution."
79. Nappalli Peter Willaims v Institute of Technical Education [1999] 2 SLR 569 at
576C-D.
80. Nappalli Peter William, id. at 576C-D. Here, a Jehovah's Witnesses schoolteacher
who was dismissed for not saying the national pledge during school flag-raising ceremonies
challenged his dismissal by arguing that saluting the national flag was a form of religious
worship which the state could not coerce.
81. Nappalli Peter Williams, id at 576B.
82. Yong CJ characterized the appellant's interpretation of the pledge and anthem
ceremony as being religious in nature as 'a distortion of secular fact into religious belief.'
This was 'a philosophical choice' not entitled to article 15 protection: Nappalli Peter
Williams, id., at 576H-I.
83. US v Seeger 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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national orthodoxy in the 1990 shared values white paper' which the
government characterised as a secular document.85
The Courts have indirectly defined 'politics' 6 broadly as "the
multitude of issues concerning how Singapore should be governed in
the interest and for the welfare of its people", including political and
social-economic government policies.8 The problem of course is, as
the government has acknowledged, certain religions like Christianity
and Islam are holistic or espouse comprehensive worldviews insofar
as they do not see a strict separation between the public and private,
the sacred and secular.8' Indeed, the government has singled out
three examples involving a clash between political and religious
views: abortion and Christianity, national service and the Jehovah's
Witnesses and the viewing of radical social action as integral to the
faith of certain sects.89 In relation to abortion, which is regulated in
Singapore under the Termination of Pregnancy Act 9°, this is
characterized as a "privatized" choice and an issue of conscience for
personal determination, although on such issues "religious groups
may and do properly take positions and preach to their followers." 9
However, the other two examples are viewed as posing threats to the
public order by constituting criminal conduct and having the potential
to heighten political and religious tensions, and so are subject to legal
regulation.
Notably, the government has stated that the reason for
separating religion from politics is not to determine the validity of any
belief system which may have socio-political implications; rather it is
"to establish working rules by which many faiths can accept
fundamental differences between them and co-exist peacefully in
84. The Shared Values white paper, supra, note 9, has been characterized as Neo
Confucianist although it expressly disavows this: paras. 39-40, and even notes that certain
Confucian practices which have given rise to undesirable mindsets like patriarchy or
nepotism were ill-suited to Singapore's modem conditions.
85. Para. 46, Shared Values white paper, id.
86. In the context of defining "engaging in domestic politics" under the terms of the
Newspaper Printing Presses Act (NPPA) (Cap 206), 2002 Revised Edition.
87. Dow Jones Publishing v AG[0] [1989] 2 ML 385
88. "Some religions explicitly deny the possibility of this separation, because to their
followers the faith encompasses all aspects of life. This is notably so of Islam and it is also
true for most Christians": para 25. MRHA white paper, supra, note 26.
89. Para 26, MRHA white paper, id.
90. (Cap 324), Revised Edition 1985.
91. Para 26(a) MRHA white paper, id.
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Singapore." '  Muslims in Singapore 9 who do not accept a
sacred/secular divide comprehend secularism in practical terms as a
form of "non-partisan (neutral) government that does not take the
side of any religion in order to ensure inter-racial harmony." 9 That
is, limits on religious freedom are instrumental to the overriding
objective of state objectives which prioritize social order, of which
racial and religious harmony is integral.
(iv) Quasi-Secularism, Communal Autonomy and Religious
Laws
The Singapore polity may more accurately be described as quasi-
secular owing to the constitutional obligation under article 152(1) of
the Government "constantly to care for the interests of the racial and
religious minorities in Singapore."9' Furthermore, in recognizing the
"special position of the Malays" as the "indigenous people of
Singapore," the government is obliged under article 152(2) to
promote and foster "their political, educational, religious, economic,
social and cultural interests and the Malay language." This is
consistent with the Singapore (Constitution) Order in Council 1958
with respect to the government's responsibility to protect Malay
interests, although this does not translate into justiciable minority
rights' or constitutionally mandated privileges. An example of
accommodating cultural diversity might be the maintenance of
separate kitchens for feeding Muslim soldiers in the Singapore
Armed Forces, giving Muslims pilgrimage leave, allowing Muslim
92. Para 27, MRHA white paper, id.
93. Mafoot Simon, 'Soul-searching continues for Muslims in S'pore', Straits Times
(Singapore), 2 Oct 2004 at 30; reviewing "Moderation in Islam in the Context of Muslim
Community in Singapore" - reject how Government has tried to define them - reject
comparisons with abangan (nominal muslims of indonsia) or Kamalists - secular ideology
of Turkey's leader Kamal Attartuk
94. Ustaz Mohd Murat Md Aris, Executive Director, Pergas 'Law that governs
Muslims' lives dynamic and realistic', Straits Times(Singapore) 11 Oct 2004 at 14.
95. Art 152(1), Singapore Constitution.
96. Art 152(2), Singapore Constitution.
97. The individualist assumptions underlying Part IV (Fundamental Liberties) is that
group interests will be safeguarded where the individual rights of group members are
secured, for example, by the equality and non-discrimination clause embodied in article
12. Nevertheless, Malays in Singapore enjoy some degree of minority protection as a
matter of government policy.
98. Under Art 153 of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia, federal law may reserve
public service positions, scholarships, trade and businesses licenses for Malays and other
indigenous peoples.
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civil servants time off for Friday prayers and allowing Muslim
prisoners to observe the fast of Ramadan.99 As a trade-off in relation
to the daily Muslim call to prayer, in return for having loudspeakers
placed only within mosques for sermons as a matter of controlling
sound levels, state television broadcasts this call five times a day.1°°
Article 153 mandates that the legislature make laws to regulate
Muslim religious affairs and to constitute a Council to advise the
President in matters relating to the Muslim religion.'O Thus, the
Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA)" which introduces a
degree of limited pluralism into this common law jurisdiction
regulates Muslim religious affairs. This safeguards cultural autonomy
for the Muslim community in matters relating to personal laws like
marriage, divorce and testamentary disposition. Thus, religious and
personal laws are given effect through norms and institutions.
Singapore has separate civil and religious courts, with the AMLA
establishing Sharia courts which have jurisdiction over these personal
law matters of persons professing Islam, and whose decisions are
generally immune from judicial review.'03 Part IX lists Muslim-
specific offences such as cohabitation outside marriage."°and enticing
an unmarried woman from the wali or lawful guardian.'5 Thus this
Act recognises that Muslim personal affairs are 'private' insofar as
they should be subject to community regulation, though the state is
not entirely absent insofar as it is state machinery that establishes
these dispute settlement mechanisms. It creates a regime of
exception in such areas as monogamous marriages as regulated under
the Women's Charter (Cap 353), as the AMLA permits polygamous
marriages although statistics indicate that this is not the norm among
Muslim men."'
99. Attorney-General Chan Sek Keong, 'Cultural Issues and Crime', 12 Singapore
Academy of Law Journal 1-25 at 16 (2000).
100. Mark Hong, supra, note 24 at para 2
101. Art 153, Singapore Constitution provides: "The Legislature shall by law make
provision for regulating Muslim religious affairs and for constituting a Council to advise
the President in matters relating to the Muslim religion."
102. (Cap 3), 1999 Revised Edition.
103. Part III, AMLA (Cap 3) regulates the Syariah court, its jurisdiction and powers.
104. Section 134, AMLA
105. Section 135. AMLA
106. Para. 17.14, Singapore's Initial Report to the UN CEDAW Committee (Ministry
of Community Development, 2000) available at
http://www.mcys.gov.sg/MCDSFiles/download/CEDAW_ initialreport.pdf. In 1997, less
than 1% of Muslim marriages solemnized involved polygamy. A disapproving first wife
may seek a divorce from the Shariah court if she is unhappy about her husband's second
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To preserve this limited degree of Muslim communal autonomy,
Singapore appended reservations to the UN Convention for the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW) which it acceded to in 1995.1°' The effect of attaching
reservations to articles 2 and 6 (modification or abolition of laws and
customs that discriminate against women) "where compliance with
these provisions would be contrary to their religious or personal
laws ' 0 significantly limits CEDAW's potential reach in eliminating
gender-biased stereotypes. Thus, the reservations allow the
continued operation of gender biased sharia-derived rules relating to
marriage, divorce, citizenship and property disposition. For example,
Islamic inheritance law stipulates that a male should receive double
the share of a female. 1°9
The AMLA establishes other Muslim specific institutions like the
Majlis Ugama Islam or MUIS (Islamic Religious Council of
Singapore), a statutory body that advises the President on Islamic
matters.' Conducting in camera meetings, its principal functions
include collecting tithes (zakat),"' administering the Mosque Building
Fund, 2 halal certification 3 and Mecca pilgrimages (haj).4  It
oversees Islamic religious education and privately funded religious
marriage. Polygamy is permitted by the Holy Quran at 4:3 which restricts the right of a
man to only marry up to 4 women at one time: Muhammad Sharif Chaudhry, Chapter 11:
'Woman and Polygamy' in Women's Rights in Islam, 1991 ed (S. Sajid Ali for Adam
Publishers & Distributors) at 83.
107. On Singapore's reservations to CEDAW, see Thio Li-ann, 'The Impact of
Internationalisation on Domestic Governance: The Transformative Potential of CEDAW'
in 1 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law (Sing JICL) 248 at 299-305
(1997).
108. The text of Singapore's reservations to CEDAW and objections to these may be
found at the website of the UN Department for the Advancement of Women, at
<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm>.
109. Part VII of AMLA regulates property and section 114 lists a set of authoritative
Islamic texts regarding questions of succession and inheritance. Section 117(1) AMLA
provides that when a wife dies intestate with her own property, preference is given first to
her male children over 21, followed by her husband and then other relatives in this order:
daughters, father, mother, brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts, nephews and nieces of the
intestate. This demonstrates preference for male over female relationship in inheritance
matters. On the Sunnite Law of Inheritance, see Asaf lyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan
Law _4h ed, 1974, XIII at 390, 448.
110. The website of MUIS is at http://www.muis.gov.sg.
111. Section 3(2)(d), AMLA.
112. Sections 3(2)(c), 76, AMLA.
113. Sections 3(2)(b), 88(A) AMLA.
114. Section 88(B), (C), AMLA.
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schools (madrasahs)"5 and maintains a registry of converts."6 Muslim
societies select Majlis members, but the state is involved as the
Singapore President, advised by the Cabinet, issues these
appointments and can terminate them in the public interest. 17 The
Singapore President must consult the Majlis before appointing the
Singapore Mufti (highest religious leader)."8  The Majlis Legal
Committee is empowered to issue fatwas or rulings on Muslim law,"9
presumptively based on the Shafi'i school of law,"2°with acceptable
sources listed in section 114.2' Notably, sectors of the Muslim
community have voiced views that MUIS as a statutory board under
the care and budget of the Ministry of Community Development
primarily serves the state rather than the Muslim community.'22 PAP
MPs have asserted that the role of MUIS demonstrates that
"Singapore is not anti-religion" 123 as religion is "allowed to play its
role in forging a harmonious and cohesive society." 124 Thus, this is
another strand of Singapore's 'unique' brand of secularism which has
been termed "secularism with a soul.
'1 25
In displaying sensitivity towards Muslim concerns, there are
instances where the Muslim community is exempt from general laws.
For example, madrasahs or Islamic religious education schools, which
are an important source of cultural identity and future religious
115. Section 87, AMLA.
116. Sections 126-128, AMLA.
117. Sections 7, 10, AMLA.
118. Section 30, AMLA.
119. Section 32, AMLA.
120. Section 33, AMLA (Cap 3), 1999 Revised Edition.
121. These include (a) The English translation of the Quaran, by A. Yusuf Ali or
Marmaduke Pickthall;
(b) Mohammedan Law, by Syed Ameer Ali; (c) Minhaj et Talibin by Nawawi, translated
by E. C. Howard from the French translation of Van den Berg; (d) Digest of
Moohummudan Law, by Neil B. E. Baillie; (e) Anglo-Muhammadan Law, by Sir Roland
Knyvet Wilson, 6th Edition Revised by A. Yusuf Ali; (f) Outlines of Muhammadan Law,
by A. A. Fyzee; (g) Muhammadan Law, by F. B. Tyabji. Section 114(2) provides that "The
Minister may on the advice of the Majlis by notification in the Gazette vary or add to the
list of books set out in subsection (1)."
122. Suzaina Kadir, 'The Role of Education in Ethnic/Religious Conflict Management:
The Singapore Case (2005) International Center for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP) Journal
Vol 2(1) January 1 at 17 (2005).
123. Zainul Abidin Rasheed, 74 Singapore Parliament Debates 23 May 2002
124. Id.
125. Id.
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leaders, are not subject to the Compulsory Education Act (Cap 51),126
although the state requires that these attain minimal educational
standards and that their students are prepared for national primary
school examinations. 7 This was in response to accusations that "the
state was intent on eliminating the last bastion of autonomous Islamic
activity in Singapore" voiced by PERGAS (Islamic Scholars
Association) .'2
During the urgent Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARs)
health crisis in mid-2003, Muslims were granted an exception to SARs
control measures of cremating victims by being allowed immediate
burial in two sealed body bags.19 In protecting the interests of the
Muslim community, Muslims are given privileged treatment through
policies such as the government sponsored "one mosque per town"
program 30 and the availability of government machinery to facilitate
Islamic tithe collection.3 '
Notably, these linkages between state and religious institutions
are not precluded by a 'establishment' clause, as Yong CJ in Colin
Chan v PP noted the "the Singapore Constitution does not prohibit
the 'establishment' of any religion," which relates to providing
financial or non-pecuniary support for a religion, as the Singapore
126. (Cap 51), Revised Edition, 2001.
127. Para. 6.10, Singapore, Second Report Periodic Report to the UN Committee on
CEDAW (Ministry of Community Development: Singapore, 2001) at
http://www.mcys.gov.sg/MCDSFiles/download/CEDAW-second-report.pdf (Second
CEDAW Report)
128. Suzaina Kadir, supra, note 122 at 14.
129. 'No wakes for suspected SARs deaths', Straits Times (Singapore), 24 April 2003,
H4.
130. Statement, Minister for Social Affairs Othman bin Wok, 37 Singapore Parliament
Reports 29 June 1977, (Mosque Building Fund Scheme), col. 62-63: "The Majlis Ugama
Islam Singapura supports the policy of the Government in building one new mosque in
each new town where the Muslim population is sufficiently large and agrees that this is the
most practical way to meet the religious needs of the Muslims as they are resettled in the
new towns." This is funded through the Mosque Building Fund Scheme whereby
employers are required to pay a small contribution per Muslim employee per month to the
fund and recover this from their Muslim employee wages.
131. Compulsory Muslim contributions towards the Mosque Building Fund are
collected through the Central Provident Fund system pursuant to sections 78 AMLA (Cap
3), with this concession being recognized as a "special one" which would "not be a
precedent for other religious or ethnic groups." It was not thought necessary to introduce
legislation to allow donations to the Hindu Endowments Board to be collected through
the CPF Board as "it would be no less convenient for Hindus to make their regular
contributions.. .through the POSB." Dr Ahmad Matter, 42 Singapore Parliament Report,
3 Dec 1982 (Contributions from Hindus for Temples etc and Monies from Muslims for
Mosques etc) col. 309-311.
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government does in relation to Islam.
132
II. State Engagement with Religion
A. State Co-Optation of Religion: The State and Religious Education
Singapore does not practice a strict, militant secularism akin to
that of France which bans religious instruction from school; it adopts
a posture more akin to the more accommodative British approach,
where the Court of Appeal declared the United Kingdom was "not a
secular state" as statutes provide for religious education and worship
in schools.133 Nevertheless, article 16(3) of the Constitution provides
that: "No person shall be required to receive instruction in or to take
part in any ceremony or act of worship of a religion other than his
own. '""3 Within Singapore, there are religious mission schools and a
limited number of madrasahs (Islamic religious schools) which
predate Independence and are allowed to operate, although the state
maintains an interest in ensuring that minimal standards are reached
and non-religious subjects like science and information technology
are taught to ensure the employability of madrasah graduates."'
The clearest example of state co-optation of Religion, or at least of
certain Religions, was the government initiative to introduce a religious
knowledge component in schools in 1984 in an attempt to bolster moral
education. 136 This course covered the major world religions, excluding
Judaism, with Confucianism, a humanist philosophy, introduced as an
option for Chinese students, although this proved unpopular."' The
religious knowledge program thus represented a departure from the
prior ethics-based civics education, where religious studies, which were
conducted in certain mission schools, were marginalised as extra-
curricular, non-examinable courses.
132. [1994] 3 SLR 662 at 681G.
133. R v Governors of Denbigh High School [2005] All ER (D) 32. For a comment, see
Li-ann Thio 'School Dress Codes, Religious Freedom and Human Rights (2005) 121 Law
Quarterly Review 572-576.
134. Singapore Constitution, 1999 Revised Edition.
135. Paragraph 6.10, Second CEDAW Report, supra, note 127.
136. Joseph Tamney, Chapter 2, 'The Religious Studies Experiment' in The Struggle
over Singapore's Soul: Western Modernisation and Asian Culture (Walter de Gruyter:
Berlin & New York, 1996) at 25.
137. Aline K Wong: Only 17.8% of the Chinese community took Confucian ethics as
compared to 44.4% who took Buddhist Studies: Singapore Parliament Reports, 6 Oct 1989
at col 603.
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Effectively, the state was engaged in defining which religions
were acceptable or at least "rehabilitated to become part of the state's
endeavour to secure a heightened degree of social control.'
13
1
Chinese folk religions were notably absent from the course; this was
unsurprising as the selected religions were expected to service the
needs of state-defined modernity - what might be called the
"rationalization" of religion in Singapore.'39 This program had the
effect of bolstering the power of mainstream religious organizations
which cooperated with the state and indeed, linkages were later
drawn between the popularity of a religion like Buddhism and its
systematic teaching in schools. "
This Religious Knowledge component was to be made a
compulsory subject, taught by specialised teachers recognised by the
mainline religious institutions and not "members of fundamentalist
sects (which have a record of evangelical excesses)."'' However, to
alleviate incipient fears that classes would become a forum for
religious conversion, it would only be taught to students professing
the faith, with non-religionists having Confucian ethics as an option.
Furthermore, parents would choose the religion they wanted their
children to learn.142 The subject would focus on "knowledge," 143
138. Michael Hill, 'The Rehabilitation and Regulation of Religion in Singapore' in
Regulating Religion: Case Studies from Around the Globe, James T Richardson ed.,
(Kluwer / Plenum Publishers, 2004) 343 at 346.
139. Tong Chee Kiong, 'The Rationalisation of Religion in Singapore' in Imagining
Singapore, Ban Kah Choon, Anne Pakir and Tong Chee Kiong (Singapore, 1992) at 276-
298. See also Andreas Ackermann, 'The Social Engineering of Culture and Religion in
Singapore' DISKUS Vol 5 (1999), web edition available at 139.Tong Chee Kiong, 'The
Rationalisation of Religion in Singapore' in Imagining Singapore, Ban Kah Choon, Anne
Pakir and Tong Chee Kiong (Singapore, 1992) at 276-298. See also Andreas Ackermann,
'The Social Engineering of Culture and Religion in Singapore' DISKUS Vol 5 (1999), web
edition available at http://www.uni-marburg.de/religionswissenschaft/journalldiskus/
ackermann.html
140. Eddie CY Kuo, Jon ST Quah and Tong Chee Kiong, National University of
Singapore, Religion and Religious Revivalism in Singapore, Report prepared for the
Ministry of Community Development (Oct 1988).[Religious Revivalism report].
141. Dr. Tay Eng Soon, 'Religious Education in Schools' 41 Singapore Parliament
Reports, 3 March 1982 col. 373. Thus, Christians would be selected from 'established
churches', teachers of Islam would be approved by MUIS, and Buddhist and Hindu
teachers accepted by the Singapore Buddhist Federation and Hindu Advisory Board.
142. There was a choice from 7 options: Bible Knowledge in English (Roman Catholic
and Protestant), Buddhist studies in English / Chinese; Hindu studies in English, Islamic
Religious Knowledge in Malay, Sikh studies in English and Civics and Current Affairs:
'Religious Knowledge: Parents to Chose', Straits Times (Singapore) 4 Aug 1983 at 78.
143. Dr. Tay Eng Soon, 'Religious Education in Schools' 41 Singapore Parliament
Reports, 3 March 1982 col. 373-374.
Winter & Spring 2006] MANAGING RELIGIOUS HARMONY IN SINGAPORE 221
rather than rituals and was designed "not to produce converts," '44
with the government giving assurances to monitor the teaching of
these subjects "to ensure that no teacher makes use of such classes for
conversion purposes. 14 5  Furthermore, to minimize religious
differences, the curriculum was constructed to exclude references to
historical or contemporary religious conflicts; it refrained from
criticizing other religions to avoid offending religious sensibilities
which breeds inter-communal tensions.14 6  Indeed, the devotional
aspects of Buddhism were downplayed and portrayed negatively in
the textbook written by the Curriculum Development Institute of
Singapore, which redefined Buddhist values "to suit the secular
context. 14 7 Thus, these efforts through religious education were an
attempt to regulate or "domesticate"' religion as an instrument for
securing social control as a "sustainer of social values" 148 or more
accurately, state ideology.
However, there was a complete policy reversal by decade's end
when the subject was made non-compulsory. This is because it had
the troubling side-effect of promoting proselytizing among students of
different faiths and had conveyed the impression that certain religions
were given "preferential status" by being taught, 149 compared to
religions like Taoism and the Baha'i faith, which were excluded from
the range of religious subjects taught. The introduction of the
religious knowledge component into public schools heightened
religious differences, inter-group tensions and the dread spectre of
religious conflicts, with the government citing a commissioned
academic report to justify this. 5° In an age of growing religious
consciousness and fervency in propagating religious beliefs, a
"fundamental change" "' had taken place rendering invalid the 1982
decision of the government to have schools play a major role in
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Joseph Tamney, 'Religion and the State in Singapore' 30 Journal of Church and
State No. 1 109-128 at 121 (1988).
147. KE Kuah, 'State and religion: Buddhism and nation-building in Singapore' Pacific
Viewpoint, 32 at 34, quoted in Michael Hill, supra, note 139 at 348.
148. Michael Hill, id., at 348.
149. Tony Tan (Minister for Education), 54 Singapore Parliament Reports, 6 Oct 1989
(Teaching of Religious Knowledge in Schools), col. 575.
150. Tony Tan, id., at col. 575, citing the National University of Singapore's Sociology
Department report on Religions and Religious Revivalism in Singapore.
151. 54 Singapore Parliament Reports, 22 Feb 1990, col. 1040.
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teaching religious knowledge to children. Thus, the education
ministry decided in 1989 to terminate the teaching of religious
knowledge as part of the upper secondary school curriculum and to
replace this with a secular course on civics/moral education meant to
inculcate shared values which would support nation-building. 52 This
marked a shift towards keeping public schools secular, downplaying
or removing religious associations from this sector of the public
realm. This declared objective was to preserve "the present climate
of religious tolerance.""' 3 The Minister for Education stated that the
teaching of religious beliefs should fall within "the province of the
home" and not schools as state institutions; in affirming the
"enormous contribution" religious groups and mission schools 5 '
towards the cause of education in Singapore, he stressed that the
Government should be seen as "scrupulously neutral and even-
handed" in handling religious matters. However, while not leaning in
favour of any particular religion, he stressed "the phrase does not
mean that Government is against religion.
1 5
What must be appreciated is that this represented an attempt by
the government to utilize religious education to support its state
ideology, which is oriented towards support of the economy through
social discipline and a coherent national identity. The chief
ministerial architects of this moral education program, Lee Kuan Yew
and Goh Keng Swee, appeared to ground it on their belief that world
religions shared common core ethical values which would combat
negative "hippy" values, "a libertine pre-occupation with self-
gratification, the cult of living for today and for myself and to hell
with others."5 6 Goh stated that "Exposure to the moral teachings of a
religion would enable pupils to imbibe universal moral values like
honesty, selflessness, a sense of duty, industry and concern for
others., 5 7 To the extent that hippyism "constitutes a total rejection
152. Id..
153. Tony Tan, supra note 151, col. 575 at 578.
154. He affirmed that schools established by religious groups had their "own
distinctive identities" and should maintain it, subject to following the guideline of non-
interference in the faith of a student not professing that school's belief unless his parents
indicate otherwise: Tony Tan, supra note 151 at col. 632. 632. Furthermore, the policy of
allowing religious groups and societies in tertiary institutions to use institutional facilities
would continue: col 634.
155. Tony Tan, supra, note 151 at col.578.
156. Quoting the Straits Times, 3 Dec 1982, Joseph Tamney, supra, note 128 at 26.
157. 'Warning: We'll be a nation of thieves if..." Straits Times (Singapore), 1 Nov 1982
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of the Protestant work ethic which is something we can't afford" and
elevated consumption over production values, effort was needed to
curb this threat.' The program rationale was to address the concern
"that younger Singaporeans have become so westernized as to lose
the sense of their cultural roots" and thus, the goal was "to transmit
cultural values rather than to teach religious beliefs"'5 9 and to
reinforce moral values which, for most power, were founded on the
teachings of major religions.1" Notably, in the 1970s, government
leaders expressed concern about moral problems such as lapses in
business ethics, declining work ethic, drug and theft problems in the
military, sending aged parents to welfare homes and elite school
snobbery.1
61
Thus, teaching and the internalization of a common moral code
would promote state ideology which espoused hard work, social
discipline, group cooperation, team effort and social obligations, with
the goal being to promote the creation of material wealth. In effect,
religious ideologies had to be modified to ensure consistency with
state ideology and to have the attributes of "support of capitalism,
tolerance of other creeds, compatibility with democratic and
universalistic norms, and a modern view of women."'162 Nevertheless,
the failed religious studies experiment demonstrated that Religion
was not a power that could be leashed by the state, and was of limited
utility as a tool of social discipline. Thus, the state resorted to the
attempt to construct a secular 'civil religion' in the form of the
communitarian and neo-Confucian shared values white paper which
would be free of religious content, insofar as Confucianism is not
deemed a religion.'
158. Joseph Tamney, 'Religion and the State in Singapore' (1988) 30(1) Journal of
Church and State 109-128, quoting Lee Kuan Yew at 112.
159. Aline Wong, 54 Singapore Parliament Reports, 6 Oct 1989, col 602.
160. Dr Tay Eng Soon (Senior Minister of State for Education), 54 Singapore
Parliament Reports, 6 Oct 1989 at col. 623: "religious faith [has] always been the
undergirding foundation behind the moral values of most societies and most cultures."
161. HL Lim, 'The Goh Keng Swee Interview: Day Three', Straits Times (Singapore)
30 Dec 1982, 1.
162. Joseph Tamney, supra, note 137 at 120.
163. See Neil A. Englehart, 'Rights and Culture in the Asian Values Argument: The
Rise and Fall of Confucian Ethics in Singapore' 22 Hum. Rts. Q. 548-568 (2000).
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B. State Co-Operation with Religion
(i) Government Definition of the Sphere of Permissible Social
Involvement by Religious Groups
The government draws a line between acceptable and
unacceptable social or public activities which religious groups may
engage in. The white paper for the Maintenance of Religious
Harmony Bill described "acceptable" activities thus:
...Many religious groups are engaged in educational,
community and social work, running schools, helping the
aged and the handicapped and operating creches for
children. Their potential future contributions to
Singapore in these areas are even greater.'64
1. Legitimate Activities of Religious Groups
Religious groups are viewed as a positive factor where they keep
out of politics and focus their energies on social welfare work. The
government encourages these activities as they represent the
privatization of compassion, which is consonant with the
government's anti-welfarism policy,'65 or provide a resource for the
government to utilize. For example, the government has no problems
cooperating with religious groups for educational purposes, as when
the Ministry of Education requested'" that the Inter-Religious
Council of Singapore (IRC),'67 formed in 1949 at the suggestion of a
Muslim theologian, stage a seminar on Religion in Singapore for
visiting American teachers in 1966." The IRC also helped the
164. MRHA white paper, supra, note 26 at para. 6.
165. On Singapore welfare policy, see Thio Li-ann, supra, note 36 at 81-83.
166. The Inter-Religious Organisation 1949-1989: IRO-40: 40" Anniversary
Commemorative Book (Singapore: Inter-Religious Organisation, 1990) at 36.
167. In 1966, Dato AI-Syed Ibrahim bin Omar Alsagoff, President of the Inter-
Religious Organisation stated at page 2: "The object of the Inter-Religious Organisation is
to establish co-operation between leaders of religions on matters agreed upon by all
religions, such as the support of justice and welfare, the prosecuting of adultery and
gambling, the resisting of anti-moral actions in films and publications and the preaching of
tolerance, charity and kindness to all God's creatures, be they human beings or animals.
Its object is also to tolerate and not to attack each other on matters which are in dispute
among followers of religion'. Today, it seeks to promote religious harmony and 'the
tolerance of the informed not the tolerance of the indifferent'. From the preface, The
Inter-Religious Organisation 1949-1989, supra, note 126.
168. See Religions in Singapore, Speeches Delivered during Seminar held at the
Conference Hall, Singapore, 10" August 1966 at 1. In 1966, there were IRO Councillors
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Ministry of Education to promote its moral education and religious
knowledge school programs helping MOE.
169
The government has provided funding for the secular programs
of voluntary welfare organizations such as Focus on the Family in
relation to its Family Life Education program which is held in
schools, which includes modules on encouraging abstinence and
'Parenting with Confidence', as this complements the Ministry of
Community Development's own strong family values policies.
70
2. Religion and Public Policy
In relation to the issue of consulting the public on major policy
issues, compared to the previous top-down approach towards
governance, the government seems to be actively soliciting views on
controversial issues such as the debate in 2005 over whether or not to
have a casino in Singapore.17' This elicited divided views and strong
opposition from both secular '72 and religious voices, 173 prompting
some debate in the newspapers as to whether religious perspectives
should be heard with respect to public policy. 17 Clearly, it would be
who were Muslim, Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Jew, Sikh and Zoroastrian.
169. Ministry of Communications and Information, 1988, 22, at 33, Religious
Revivalism Report, supra, note 141.
170. Anti-religionists have voiced insensible protests that support for these
programmes were an imposition of religion but the government funds secular programmes
of groups (not the groups themselves) which is a health instance of co-operation with civil
society: 'Ministry funds only VWOs' secular programmes', Straits Times (Singapore) 3 Dec
2003, Forum, available on LEXIS.
171. 'Minister: Expect early open consultation on divisive issues' Straits Times
(Singapore) 1 July 2005, H14
172. 'Opposition gives red light to casino plan', Agence France Presse, 7 April 2005,
archived at http://www.singapore-window.org/sw05/050407af.htm, <visited 1 Oct 2005> ;
'Wrong buzz route', Straits Times (Singapore), 21 April 2005; 'Casino: Not fruitful to keep
arguing, says PM' Straits Times, 27 April 2005, available on LEXIS.
173. 'Muis against having a casino', Straits Times (Singapore) 11 Feb 2005 at H7;
'Churches council speaks out against casino idea', Straits Times (Singapore) 15 July 2004;
The anti-Casino lobby included the Singapore Buddhist Federation, the Hindu
Endowments Board and the National Council of Churches Singapore, in addition to
MUIS who voiced objections on religious and social grounds. There is a feeling in some
quarters that the solicitation of public views was mainly a cosmetic exercise: Chua Mui
Hoong, 'Don't give up battle, even if casino gets nod', Straits Times (Singapore), 9 March
2005, available on LEXIS.
174. 'Catholic Church opposed to casino here', Straits Times (Singapore), 4 Sept 2004;
Manjit Singh Sree Govind Menon, 'Don't bring religion into casino debate', Straits Times
(Singapore), Forum, 8 April 2005, Thio Li-ann, 'Hearing out religion in public debate'
Straits Times (Singapore), Review, 15 Dec 2004; Lim Eng Cheng, 'Religious groups should
speak with louder voice' Straits Times (Singapore), Forum, 6 Dec 2004; Lydia Lim,
'Emerging role of religion in politics' Straits Times (Singapore), 23 April 2005; 'Review-
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censorship and undemocratic to exclude religiously-based
perspectives and to privilege 'secular' perspectives, insofar as these
ideologies are distinct as they are not necessarily mutually exclusive.'
Certainly, the government has shown some solicitude for religious
concerns in broadly consulting religious groups on public issues such
116as living wills, compulsory education and whether to have a casino.
The government has declared its appreciation for views voiced by
religious groups, where these are framed in accessible, rational and
clear terms, in a responsible fashion.'77
Nevertheless, the government justifies its decisions in terms of
economic rationality and national progress, and retains the final say
over political objections and alternative perspectives, whether
religious or non-religious. The government after making a decision to
have two integrated resorts with casinos urged Singaporeans to rally
behind their decisions as continued debate would "harden views for
and against" 178 and "polarize our multiracial, multi-religious society"
179; it noted that "religious and moral arguments against the casino" 10
Insight: the role of religion in politics'. Straits Times (Singapore) 30 April 2005; Aaron
Low, '6 in 10 want religious input in policy-making', Straits Times (Singapore) 16 July
2005; available on LEXIS
175. See generally Thio Li-ann, 'In a democracy, all have a right to be heard', Straits
Times (Singapore), Forum, 22 Feb 2005, H6; 'State, Religion and the Public Square',
Straits Times, (Singapore), Forum, 11 Dec 2003, available on LEXIS.
176. Various religious groups including MUIS, Singapore Buddhist Federation, Hindu
Endowments Board, National Council of Churches of Singapore have spoken out against
having a casino. MUIS expressed its opposition on 2 grounds first, on religious grounds,
Islam totally rejects gambling and social harm it bring. Further, Islam enjoins that a living
be earned through hard work and not chance or luck; on social grounds, MUIS research
indicated negative social costs in the form of the addictive behaviour of those lower
income groups, youths and drug addicts which would be exacerbated by enlarging the
sphere of legal gambling: 'Muis against having a Casino', Straits Times, (Singapore), 11
Feb 2005 at H7. An online petition against having a casino was also initiated, but to no
avail: 'Man behind casino petition' Straits Times (Singapore) 25 April 2005, available on
LEXIS.
177. Former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong commended social conservatives and
religious community members for "clearly and responsibly" expressing their concerns
against a further liberalisation of the militant homosexual agenda, as this would erode
other civil liberties and undermine public health and morality. He did not "encourage or
endorse a gay lifestyle" despite relaxing policy to allow homosexuals to be hired for key
civil service positions, subject to disclosure: PM Goh Chok Tong, "From the Valley to the
Highlands", (National Day Rally Speech, 17 August 2003), online: Sing. Govt. Press
Release <http://www.gov.sg/nd/ND03.htm>.
178. 'Casino: Not fruitful to keep arguing, says PM; It's time to move on and make
resorts a success, instead of risking rift in society', Straits Times (Singapore) 27 April 2005,
available on LEXIS.
179. Id.
Winter & Spring 2006] MANAGING RELIGIOUS HARMONY IN SINGAPORE 227
represented a "strand of strict, moralist thinking" 181 integral to "our
social immune system," 182 but nevertheless appealed to secularism
and pragmatism to justify what remains a contentious decision and to
cloak it with a mythical air of neutrality.'83 In seeking to get
Singaporeans to close ranks and support the casino initiative, the
Prime Minister welcomed the offer of many social welfare and
religious groups who opposed having a casino to help tackle social
problems related to this project, that is, excessive gambling and
associated evils. 84 He noted, "Religious and social work groups will
also have a role to play, to exhort their followers to live upright lives,
to have this social network so you'll know who is in trouble, who is...
wandering too far, and to counsel and help those who will get into
trouble. So I hope that those who oppose the IR on moral or
religious grounds will continue to engage themselves and exert a
positive force on society.'. 85 Thus, the state retains the final say on
policy decisions and religionists are either disregarded or co-opted to
serve state interests.1 86
C. State Control of Religion
(i) State Control over Religion
The state employs both formal legislative and informal methods





184. 'They are anti-casino, but ready to help', Straits Times (Singapore) 22 April 2005.
PM Lee noted: "'We are very grateful for the understanding of these religious leaders and
we will make full use of their resources, networks and sense of mission to tackle the side
effects of problem gambling."
185. 'They are anti-casino, but ready to help',id.
186. In justifying the decision to have 2 Integrated Resorts with casinos, Prime
Minister Lee stated that the Government adopted a "secular and pragmatic approach"
and could not "enforce the choices of one group on others". He characterised the aim to
have "a decent and wholesome society" but "not a puritanical or hypocritical one." He
noted the religious objections of Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims and Christians. He affirmed
that "Religious faith is a powerful force motivating Singaporeans to help their fellow
citizens" and hoped that religious groups "will work together with the Government to help
to build strong families, which are the basic units of a resilient and stable society."
Statement by the Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Proposal to Develop Integrated
Resorts, 80 Singapore Parliament Reports 18 May 2005, available at
<http://app.sprinter.gov.sg/data/pr/2005041803.htm>.
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undermining political authority or stirring inter-religious friction.
While freedom of conscience is absolute, what is circumscribed is the
manner in which religion is practiced and propagated. As Prakash J
noted in Colin Chan v Minister for Information and the Arts,
The necessity for such a limitation on religious freedom
can be easily understood in the modern world where
everyday there are examples of conflicts arising from
religious differences since, unfortunately, what to one
person is a self-evident religious truth can to another be
either rank heresy or dangerous fanaticism."
This section outlines the methods of control and then identifies
and examines how particular threats are managed by the state.
1. Informal Methods of Control
In terms of informal methods of control, one recent development
has been the adoption of the non-legally binding government-
initiated Declaration on Religious Harmony, 88 which was drafted in
consultation with religious leaders, headed by an agnostic Minister of
State and adopted in 2003. By laying down a set of guidelines, it
seeks to pre-empt religious conflict and radicalism and promote
pacific co-existence among religious groups.189 The government has
also consistently exhorted religious leaders to urge moderation and
toleration amongst their flock and, more recently, to self-regulate and
weed out religious extremists through community policing."9
187. [19951 3 SLR 644 at 654B.
188. Neo Hui Min 'More than words, a S'pore way of life' Straits Times (Singapore),
10 June 2003, available on LEXIS.
189. The principles stated are (i) Recognise the secular nature of our State; (ii)
Promote cohesion within our society; (iii) Respect each other's freedom of religion; (iv)
Grow our common space while respecting our diversity; (v)Foster inter-religious
communications. Text available at http://www.mcys.gov.sg/MCDSFiles/download/
Dec.relig-harmony.doc
190. "The government recognises that in its efforts to identify and neutralise radical
teachers and foreign terrorist operatives, it must not disrupt the legitimate practices and
peaceful activities of the local Myuslim community. With the support of the Government,
the Muslim community will need to propose and implement measures to prevent
dangerous foreign influences, such as the distorted teachings of foreign preachers.. .from
infiltrating Singapore and influencing Muslims here. For a start, the Muslim community
must develop a comprehensive, self-regulatory system to monitor religious education.
Such a system will help the Muslim community to detect dangerous extremist
teachings.. .All Singaporeans, and not just Muslims, must exercise vigilance against
extremist religious teachings and suspicious or clandestine activities": The Jemaah
Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism, white paper (Cmd. 2 of 2003, Singapore
Ministry of Home Affairs) at 22, available at Ministry for Home Affairs website at
http://www2.mha.gov.sg/mha/index.jsp.
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(ii) Formal Legislation: General and Specific Regulations
1. General Law
The government has available a range of general laws which seek
to regulate religiously related conflict or unrest. For example,
Chapter XV of the Penal Code (Cap 224) contains a section on
'Offences relating to religion' which includes disturbing a religious
assembly, injuring a place of worship with intent to insult a religion or
uttering words with deliberate intent to wound the religious feelings
of a person, punishable by fine and/or imprisonment)91 Clearly,
religious sensitivities also inform the scope of free speech. This is
evident in the regulations governing the Speakers Corner,"9 which is a
small city park, modelled after the one in London's Hyde Park, and is
exempted from the general requirement that a licence is needed for
public speaking. However, the substantive scope of speech is limited
insofar as the speaker cannot deal with any matter which relates to
"any religious belief or to religion generally" or which may "cause
feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will or hostility between different racial
or religious groups in Singapore". 93 Furthermore, no licenses are
needed for indoor talks in a recent liberalization of speech controls,
unless the topics "touch on sensitive issues like race and religion." '94
The government also has recourse to general laws within the
administrative framework which enable it to preventively detain
persons using religion in a manner so as to prejudice the security of
Singapore' g to issue prohibition orders banning religious literature '96
191. Section 295-298 Penal Code (Cap 224), 1985 Revised Edition.
192. See Li-ann Thio, 'Speakers Cornered? Managing Political Speech in Singapore
and the Commitment 'To Build a Democratic Society', 3 International Journal of
Constitutional Law 516-524 (2003).
193. Section 3(1)(c) Public Entertainments and Meetings Act (Cap 257, Section 16)
2001 Revised Edition; Public Entertainments and Meetings (Speakers' Corner)
(Exemption) Order.
194. PM Lee Hsien Loong, 2004 National Day Rally Speech,
http://app.sprinter.gov.sg/data/pr/2004083101.htm 6/20/2005 Notably, Lee mentioned that
as evidence of a progressive opening up in Singapore in terms of public debate after the
events of 9-11, that "we were able to discuss openly and maturely gut issues of race and
religion, and how we could build trust between Muslims and non-Muslims." Speech by
Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the Harvard Club of Singapore's 35th
Anniversary Dinner-Building A Civic Society, available at
http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN015426.pdf
195. Internal Security Act, (Cap 143), [011985 Revised Edition.
196. Undesirable Publications Act, (Cap 338), 1998 Revised Edition. [0]
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and to de-register religious associations.' 9'
State control over various religious groups has been exerted
through the technique of de-registering groups under the terms of the
Societies Act,98 which are considered to be threats to social order by
opposing national policies like military service (Jehovah's Witnesses),
who utilize religious institutions for political involvement (Christian
conference of Asia) and who brainwash and destroy families
(Unification Church)."9 The Jehovah's Witnesses brought a series of
constitutional challenges to both the de-registration order issued
under the Societies Act and the prohibition order banning
watchtower literature under the Undesirable Publications Act',
which the courts upheld as reasonable restrictions to religious
freedom in service of public order claims. The reasoning was that any
religious belief that undermines the state's national military policy
was considered to undermine public order. As Chief Justice Yong
noted:
The basis for the de-registration clearly flowed from the
danger of allowing absolute freedom of religion which
might create a complete denial of a government's
authority and ability to govern individuals or groups
asserting a religious affiliation. The Jehovah's Witnesses
were not mere conscientious objectors to national service
but were engaging in conduct which was prejudicial to
national security.20'
Religious groups are also subject to the general law of the land.
For example, in relation to cults,20 the government has stated that as
197. Societies Act (Cap 311), 1985 Revised Edition.
198. Cap 311, 1985 Revised Edition.
199. 'Three religious groups banned in Singapore', Straits Times (Singapore), 19 Jan
1996 at 29. See also Report of the Special Rapporteur Mr. Abdelfattah Amor,
Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination based on Religion or Belief, E/CN.4/1997/91, 39 Dec 1996, para. 17; 65
Singapore Parliament Reports, 18 Jan 1996 (Religious / Quasi-Religious Organisations:
Ban), cols. 430-432.
200. (Cap 338), 1998 Revised Edition.
201. Chan Hiang Leng Colin v Public Prosecutor [1994] 3 SLR 662 at 688. Notably, the
Jehovah's Witnesses arrived in Singapore in 1940 and was registered in 1962 as the
Singapore Congregation of the Jehovah's Witnesses, which was prior to the military
conscription policy introduced in 1967.
202. For a judicial discussion of the term 'cult' in the Singapore context, see Central
Christian Church & Anor v Chen Cheng & Ors [1997] SGHC 292; Chen Cheng and
Another v Central Christian Church [1999] 1 SLR 94; [19981 SGCA 51
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a "secular body" 203 it is not concerned with "issues of religious
doctrinal purity or deviance." 204 Thus, all legally registered groups,
such as the Falun Gong are not acted against because they are
labelled as 'cults' but only insofar as they act unlawfully, such as
206staging an assembly without a permit.
2. The Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (Cap 167A)
He also noted that although the Maintenance of
Religious Harmony Act had not been invoked, its
existence reminded Singaporeans of the fragility
of religious harmony, as seen in countries like
Bosnia, Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland.
- Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, 199607
The Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA) °" was
adopted in 1990 as a partial response to the perceived threat of
conversions stemming from aggressive evangelization by certain
groups and that of subversion, in relation to the dangers of mixing
religion with politics. The government considered that this legislation
was necessary owing to the retrogression in inter-religious group
relations, although it was something introduced "more in sorrow than
with joy," 209 designed to "prevent us from sliding backward" 210 and
203. 71 Singapore Parliament Reports, 6 March 2000, (Cults) col. 1141.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. There was some debate within Parliament as to whether the government could
provide assurances it would not "take orders from Beijing", in relation to an alleged
direction sent by the Chairman of the People's Associations to community centres to
withdraw facilities (where these had been previously granted) after China started it's
crackdown on Falungong: 72 Singapore Parliament Reports 12 Jan 2001, (Falungong
Members) Col. 1275-1278. The Falungong Human Rights Working Group issued a
complaint before the United Nations in April 2005: 206.There was some debate within
Parliament as to whether the government could provide assurances it would not "take
orders from Beijing", in relation to an alleged direction sent by the Chairman of the
People's Associations to community centres to withdraw facilities (where these had been
previously granted) after China started it's crackdown on Falungong: 72 Singapore
Parliament Reports 12 Jan 2001, (Falungong Members) Col. 1275-1278. The Falungong
Human Rights Working Group issued a complaint before the United Nations in April
2005: http://www.clearharmony.net/articles/200505/26354p.html
207. Straits Times Report of Comments of DPM Lee: "Religious peace must be
maintained': Otherwise things will never be the same if conflict breaks out: BG Lee, Straits
Times (Singapore) 20 May 1996 at 3.
208. (Cap 167A), 2001 Revised Edition.
209. DPM Goh Chok Tong, 51 Singapore Parliament Reports, col. 1148 at 1159 (23
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"not something we are very proud of."'21' Tamney observed that the
clear targets of this piece of legislation which sought to separate
religious from state authority were leftist Christianity which
apparently informed the so-called Marxist conspiracy of the late
1980s and Islamic fundamentalism.212
Under the Act, the Minister is empowered to issue non-
justiciable 'restraining orders' on religionists or opportunists where
the Minister is satisfied that such a person is or is attempting to
commit acts
(a) causing feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will or hostility between
different religious groups;
(b) carrying out activities to promote a political cause, or a cause
of any political party while, or under the guise of, propagating or
practising any religious belief;
(c) carrying out subversive activities under the guise of
propagating or practising any religious belief; or
(d) exciting disaffection against the President or the Government
while, or under the guise of, propagating or practising any
religious belief."3
These orders may restrain a person from addressing a group,
publishing materials or holding office in relation to a religious
214publication, without the Minister's prior permission. This order
seeks to operate pre-emptively and promptly, avoiding the publicity
of a court case for a person persecuted for stirring up religious ill-will
and prosecuted under the terms of the Penal Code21 or Sedition
Act.2"6 Thus, it was meant to be cautionary and preventive, with
deterrence rather than punishment as its goal. Unlike the Internal
Security Act, the MRHA addresses the misuse of religion, for
example, to promote political causes, rather than subversion.217




212. Joseph Tamney, supra, note 137 at 36-37.
213. Section 8(1)(a)-(d), MRHA (Cap 167A), 2001 Revised Edition.
214. Section 8(2)(a)-(c), id.
215. Penal Code (Cap 224), 1985 Revised Edition.
216. Sedition Act (Cap 290), 1985 Revised Edition.
217. Although a ground for issuing a MRHA restraining order is the "carrying out
subversive activities under the guise of propagating or practising any religious belief":
Section 8(1)(c), MRHA (Cap 167A), 2001 Revised Edition.
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may be subject to a fine (up to $20,000) or maximal 3 year term of
imprisonment.218
The broadly drafted terms justifying the issue of a restraining
order gives considerable discretion to the Minister who is empowered
to determine the ambit of 'religion' and 'politics,' distinguishing the
promotion of religion as the basis for shared moral values from that
of religion in its subversive and divisive capacity. 19 In so doing the
state arrogated to itself the right to define the parameters of the
permissible in terms of Religion in the public sphere, giving it a tool
to control the religious institutions as intermediate civil society actors.




It was feared that the MRHA might be used to quell legitimate
political dissent and check political opposition through the intrusion
of politics into religion.21 A limited check is available in the form of
the Presidential Council of Religious Harmony (PCRH), which the
MRHA established as a body composing both lay and religious
representatives.22 If the PCRH disagrees with the view of the
Cabinet government about the issuing of the restraining order, the
elected president under article 221 of the Constitution may cancel
such restraining orders.223 Thus, in the composition of the PCRH, the
government has co-opted leaders of the main religions, rendering
them accountable both for their own conduct as leaders and for that
of their followers.
Since its inception, the workings of the MRHA has been almost
invisible to the public eye, as it does not involve the public setting of a
218. Section 16, MRHA (Cap 167A), 2001 Revised Edition.
219. The MRHA white paper, supra, note 26 describes both positive religious activities
(para.6) and subversive ones: page 7, section 26b; Annex, 'Religious Trends - A Security
Perspective' Annex MRHA White Paper at para 1.
220. Vineeta Sinha, supra, note 25 at 26.
221. Dr Lee Siew Choh, 54 Singapore Parliament Report, 22 Feb 1990 (Maintenance of
Religious Harmony Bill), cols 1102-1110
222. Section 3 of the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (Cap 167A), 2001
Revised Edition provides for this Council which is to have between 6 and 15 members, not
less than two-thirds of whom shall be "representatives of the major religions in
Singapore". The other members "shall be persons who, in the opinion of the Presidential
Council for Minority Rights, have distinguished themselves in public service or community
relations in Singapore."
223. Art 221 of the Singapore Constitution provides: "The President, acting in his
discretion, may cancel, vary, confirm or refuse to confirm a restraining order made under
the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (Cap. 167A) where the advice of the Cabinet
is contrary to the recommendation of the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony."
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court nor do the relevant government bodies publish any reports in
this respect. In a newspaper report, the Home Affairs Minister Wong
Kan Seng enumerated 3 instances where it was almost invoked,
stating that it was useful as a deterrent in cautioning religious leaders.
One instance related to mixing religion and politics as when an
Islamic leader had urged Muslims to vote for Muslim candidates
during the 1991 General Elections. The other two related to
occasions where one religious leader had criticised other faiths. In
1992, a Christian pastor was warned to refrain from criticising other
faiths like Buddhism, Taoism and Catholicism through the pulpit and
through publications, and in 1995, an Islamic religious leader was
admonished for criticising a widespread Hindu belief that statutes of
their deity, Ganesha, could drink milk offerings, which the leader had
labelled not a miracle but the work of the devil.224
(iii) Perceived Threats Posed by Religion
State ambivalence towards religion is evident insofar as the state
not only views it as a constructive but also, a destructive social force.
There are various ways that Religion is considered to threaten the
State since its inception and also, in light of the trend towards
religious revivalism evident from the late 1970s to 1980s. These
threats are in some instances complicated and made volatile by their
implication of ethnicity where closely correlated with religion, as for
the Muslim community.
Briefly, major issues related to religious conflict include the
apparent conspiracy to erect a Marxist state with the conspirators
allegedly infiltrating Catholic organizations225 and the questioning of
loyalty of Malay Muslim soldiers in the late 1980s226, the religious
freedom litigation brought primarily by the Jehovah's Witnesses in
the 1990sI 27 and the uncovering of the bomb plot by self-proclaimed
224. 'Govt reins in religious leaders', Straits Times (Singapore), 12 May 2001at 1.
225. See generally Chng Suan Tze v Minister of Home Affairs 2 [1989] 1 MLJ 69; Teo
Soh Lung v Minister of Home Affairs[1989] 2 MLJ 449; Vincent Cheng v Minister of Home
Affairs[1990] 1 MLJ 449. On the parliamentary debates in relation to the 'Marxist
Conspiracy': 51 Sing. Parl. Rep., May 31, 1988, at col 238. See generally Francis Seow, To
Catch a Tartar: A Dissident in Lee Kuan Yew's Prison (1994); 'The conspiracy theory' Far
Eastern Economic Review (22 October 1987).
226. 100 Malays for dialogue with SM today' Straits Times (Singapore) 2 March 2001,
3; 'Integration has brought benefits to all': SM's Dialogue with the Malay Community'
Straits Times, (Singapore) 4 March 2001, H34.
227. The leading case is Colin Chan v PP [1994] 3 SLR 662. Other cases include
Dennis Kok v. P.P. [1997] 1 SLR 123; Chan Cheow Khiang v. P.P. [1996] 3 SLR 271;
Winter & Spring 2006] MANAGING RELIGIOUS HARMONY IN SINGAPORE 235
fundamentalist Islamic terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah22 in
December 2001. In a post 9-11 political landscape, this plummeted
ethnic relations to an all-time low. This was exacerbated by the
'tudung controversy' in January-February 2002, which some viewed
as an assertive attempt by members of the Muslim community,
through demands to wear religious dress in schools, to underscore
expressions of religious identity in public spaces. 29 This resonated
with growing concerns that Muslims were becoming more insular and
isolationist, owing to their 'Arabicisation'2 in terms of dress, diet and
social interaction. This manifested in the adoption of stricter forms of
religious dress in the push for a more stringent, holistic practice of
Islam that brooks no distinction between the sacred and the secular."'
1. Aggressive Proselytization and Disrupting the Religious Equilibrium
... in a multi-religious society, if any of the religions
develop too rapidly, it would naturally result in reactions
or response from other religious groups in self-defence2
32
In managing religious harmony, there appears to be an
Nappalli v. ITE [1999] 2 SLR 569; David Quak v. P.P. [1999] 1 SLR 533; Pte. Chai Tshun
Chieh v. Chief Military Prosecutor, Military Court of Appeal No. 1 of 1989.
228. "Security, harmony, the main worry now" Straits Times (Singapore) (11 February
2002) at 4; "The Case Against the Jemaah Islamiah", Straits Times (Singapore), 31 May
2002, at H2.
229. "By barring religious garb, Singapore dress code alienates Muslims" New York
Times (2 March 2002) at A6 column 1. See also "In placid Singapore, civil disobedience
simmers" The Christian Science Monitor (5 February 2002) at 7; "PM firm on tudung
issue" Straits Times(Singapore) (3 Feb 2002) at 1.
230. The 1988 Report noted the growing influence of Islamic fundamentalism in
Singapore manifest in the insistence of some Malays on following orthodox Islamic
precepts and the wearing of jilbab or purdah by some women. The Report distinguished
between Muslim fundamentalism (fidelity to orthodoxy) and Islamic radicalism
(politicisation) and noted that the latter did not then pose a real threat to Singapore:
Religious Revivalism Report, supra, note 141 at 42-43.
231. Government leaders urge Muslims to be pragmatic within a multi-racial, multi-
religious society. Given that Islam bans gambling, in response to the disappointing
decision to have a casino in Singapore, a Muslim Minister Yaacob Ibrahim called for
Muslims to respect the difference between public and private morality. He noted that "We
understand that in our multi-ethnic and multi-religious society, it is not tenable for
government policies to be dictated by the views of any one group or groups."
Furthermore, religious objections had not led to the banning of abortion or the use of
contraceptives. He urged that: "What we believe is good and right for society" should be
shared graciously and respectfully "through dialogue and education, without imposing on
others": Azhar Ghani, 'Muslims urged to view decision with pragmatism', Straits Times
(Singapore), 19 April 2005, available on LEXIS.
232. Ow Chin Hock, 54 Singapore Parliament Reports, 6 Oct 1989, col 619
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assumption that equilibrium should be preserved in maintaining a
certain religious composition of the population, given the disruptive
effects of communal tensions which religious conversions engender.
This delicacy of this balance was threatened by increased religious
fervour and evangelism activities. Thus, the Ministry of Community
Development (MCD) commissioned an academic study to assess
trends in relation to Religion within the context of Singapore's
changing social environment, entitled Religion and Religious
Revivalism in Singapore in 1988."3 The growth of Christianity and
Islam and the demonstrated increase in interests amongst their
followers to engage in religious activities caused official concern and
partly motivated the abrupt termination of the Religious Knowledge
school education program after only 4 years. 34
The Report cautioned that the increasing number of members
joining faiths like Christianity at the expense of other religious groups
made insecure by diminishing numbers "may threaten to disrupt the
subtle and delicate equilibrium which has characterized the religious
scene in Singapore for decades."" 5  Notably one of the major
objectives of the commissioned MCD Project was "To describe the
characteristics of those persons who have been attracted to
Christianity, and to find out, among the new converts, the reasons for
and the process of their conversion, 236 There was especial concern
that Christians were wielding an influence disproportionate to their
numbers as most Christians "are of relatively higher socio-economic
status (in education, occupation and income)," which might
incorporate a social class dimension into religious conflict.237
Furthermore, it opined that the "rapid growth in Christianity" 238
233. Religious Revivalism Report, supra note 141.
234. The Report, id, noted that aside from the substantial growth in Christians since
1950, largely in part to charismatic churches attracting English educated Chinese, the
number of atheists/agonistics was also increasing: at 5. Furthermore, while there was a
considerable decline in traditional Chinese religions since the 1980s, there was a revival in
Buddhism in part spurred by "the teaching of Buddhism as a moral/religious education
course has drawn attention to it, and this has facilitated its promotion in Singapore": at 6.
Compare to Taoism which was perceived as irrational and superstitious, the teaching of
Buddhism in schools made it appear "more logical, systematic and relevant: at 25, 28. It
also postulated that the introduction of Bible Knowledge as part of the religious
Knowledge programme "may have the indirect function of promoting Christian
conversion": at 15.
235. Religious Revivalism report, supra, note 141 at 2.
236. Id., at 3.
237. Id., at 11.
238. Id at 31.
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particularly had implications for the "long-term delicate equilibrium"
239 of all religions" as its "evangelist activities are often perceived by
members of other faiths to be aggressive and showing little sensitivity
to their feelings.",240 The conversion of Muslims and Hindus to
Christians was considered to pose "a threat to the Hindu
community 2 4' and with respect to Muslims, "even a few isolated cases
of conversion may cause great concern among the community".242
The MRHA white paper which was laid before Parliament in
1989, in discussing the need for legislation to maintain religious
harmony, noted a shift in social attitudes from the "relaxed tolerant
acceptance of and coexistence with other faiths" towards "strongly
held exclusive beliefs".243 Annexed to the MRHA white paper was a
report compiled by the Internal Security Department detailing threats
to security and religious harmony and thereby underscoring "the
delicacy of Singapore's multi-religious balance.",24  These security
threats were listed under 3 categories: "Aggressive and Insensitive
Proselytisation," "Mixing Religion and Politics" and "Religion and
Subversion.
245
2. Aggressive and Insensitive Proselytization
Prosleytization is a constitutionally guaranteed aspect of
religious liberty in Singapore. However, the government has urged
that this must be exercised sensitively, by drawing a distinction
between interested persons and attempts to convert people out of
their faith by denigrating his religion, which could cause great offense.
239. Id at 31.
240. Id at 31.
241. Id., at 8. Notably, the Hindus welcomed the MRHA seeing it as a tool to protect
their small community from aggressive conversion tactics. In the submission (Paper 47) of
the Hindu Endowments Board in respect of the proposed legislation, it states in para. 1:
"As a minority community and as one whose underlying religious beliefs are liberal and
broad-based, we are of the view that the dangers of strong proselytisation are real. The
actual conversion of Hindus to other religions is of concern to us. The process and manner
in which they have attempted to do so is of graver concern." Hinduism was painted as a
weaker religion in terms of influence, one lacking a 'dogmatic religious militancy' and thus
vulnerable to strong influences stemming from other "more predominant" religions.
Report of the Select Committee on the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill (Bill No.
14/0), Part. 7. of 1990 (Presented to Parliament on 29'h Oct, 1990) Minutes of Evidence, 20
Sept 1990, 13-20.
242. Religious Revivalism report, supra note 141 at 7.
243. MRHA White Paper, supra, note 26 at para 10.
244. 'Religious Trends -A Security Perspective' Annex MRHA White Paper, id., para
1.
245. Id.
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As such, the government has always been alert to Muslim sensitivities
towards Christian evangelism.
From the inception of the new nation, Prime Minister Lee Kuan
Yew took steps to address religious leaders in 1965 on techniques of
religious evangelism which he likened to Communist 'agit-prop'
whereby propaganda was used to agitate workers to embark upon
rampages disruptive to the social order.2 6 He cited as an example of
"religious agit-prop" an "active vicious campaign" alleging that
Catholics sought to convert Muslim boys by "ply(ing) him with a
beautiful female Christian and with $500 and the promise of a job", as
reported in the Malay language newspaper, Utusan Melayu.27 He
speculated that a political object could be to excite the Muslim
community outside Singapore in South-east Asia "into a very
bellicose frame of mind"2 consequently reducing non-Muslims in the
region "to a state of mild and submissive docility., 249 In the interests
of averting religious conflict, Mr. Lee noted:
I have assured the Christians that Singapore has many
people with no religious guidance whatsoever, no
religious beliefs whatsoever... I would say more than 70
per cent are either vaguely agnostic or iconoclasts....
And there is a very wide field of operation. I see no need
for going around looking for the 12 per cent Muslims to
try and convert them because I think there are 60 to 70
per cent of people who are in need of some form of
religious and moral guidance.'25 °
Thus, the government has from the outset demonstrated especial
regard for Muslim sensitivities, not least because it is surrounded by
Muslim-majority nations like Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, who have
expressed concerned for their kin in Singapore. This flows from the
centrality of Islam as a focal point for Malay nationalism.
In the 1970s and 1980s, there was change in Singapore's religious
composition. This gave rise to the fear that what was considered a
disproportionately large number of converts to Christianity, who left
"other religious communities," 251 would become a serious cause of
246. Transcript of the Prime Minister's Statement to Religious Representatives and





251. Ministry of Community Development Report, cited in para 12, MRHA white
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agitation. Thus, frequent interaction among citizens gave opportunity
for a "dominant" (in terms of influence) religion to encroach upon
the territory of a "weaker" religion, thus posing a threat to the latter.
The traditionally accepted "boundaries" 2 of respective religions thus
"have become ambiguous and are shifting". 253  Religious harmony
would be imperilled, were religious groups to denigrate other faiths
or "insensitively trying to convert those belonging to other
religions.,214
This suggests that political stability "is premised on a particular
formulaic configuration of religious communities., 255  Indeed, the
MRHA white paper reiterated the caution that "if any religious group
in Singapore seeks to increase the number of its converts drastically
at the expense of the other faiths.. .it will be strenuously resisted by
the other groups.' '211 Indeed, certain groups like the Buddhists, 7 who
are the larger religious group in Singapore, and Taoists have
demonstrated such insecurity in complaining to the government about
aggressive proselytization,rA v with some going to the extent of
suggesting that this should be banned, contrary to the constitutional
guarantee of propagation and free speech.
The Annex to the MRHA white paper detailed instances both
between and within religious denominations relating to aggressive
proselytization. Orthodox Muslims who consider the Ahmadis a
deviant sect protested when the Ahmadis called their building a
mosque." Catholics were riled by Protestant publications describingthe Pope as a Communist or even the anti-Christ.260 The Annex
paper, supra, note 26.
252. Ministry of Community Development Report, cited in para 12, MRHA white
paper, supra, note 26.
253. Id.
254. Para 13, MRHA white paper, supra, note 26.
255. Vineeta Sinha, 'Scrutinizing the Themes of "Sameness" and "Difference" in the
Discourse on Multireligiosity and Religious Encounters in Singapore' in Alatas, Lim &
Kuroda eds., Asian Interfaith Dialogue: Perspectives on Religion, Education and Social
Cohesion (Centre for Research on Islamic and Malay Affairs RIMA and The World Bank,
2003) 203 at 213.
256. Para 17, MRHA white paper, supra, note 26
257. Reportedly, the Chinese Buddhist population in the 1990s increased from 40 to
54%, with Chinese Taoists declining from 28 to 11%. Jason Leow, 'Christianity popular
among Chinese here' The Straits Times (Singapore) (18 Nov 2000) at 7.
258. "Religious code goes beyond keeping peace", Straits Times (Singapore) 16 Oct
2002 at H2.
259. Annex, MRHA white paper, supra, note 26 at para 9.
260. Id., at para 11.
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particularly singled out disputes between Christians and Muslims
because "Muslims are extremely sensitive to any attempt to convert
them to other faiths" '261 and have responded by holding talks in
mosques on "the danger posed by Christian evangelist 26 2 taking steps
to put up notices in mosques of Muslim converts to Christianity and
warning other Muslims to avoid them. 263 Furthermore, it reported
that in 1986, the Internal Security Department had called up 11
Christian leaders who had been evangelizing Muslims, advising them
"to avoid activities which could cause misunderstanding or conflict."
264
3. Mixing Religion and Politics
Religion is seen as a socially disruptive threat where it is mixed
with politics and used to mobilize political support against the
government to promote a political agenda or worse, to subvert the
state. For example, the government threatened to unleash the
Internal Security Act on Malay opposition politician Jufrie Mahmood
who had invoked terms while campaigning during the 1988 General
Elections like Insyallah (God willing) and Alhamdulilah (all praise to
God).265 PAP MPs criticized this as an attempt to stir up the Malay
ground and to radicalise politics. 266 Prime Minister Goh also noted
two members of Pertubohan Kebangsaan Melayu Singapura (PKMS),
a Malay-based political party, had mixed religion with politics at a
rally when they said Muslims should choose leaders of the same
faith.267 This hard-line stance against invoking religious loyalties in
political rallies stems from the realization of the potential of Religion
for political mobilization. Nevertheless, government ministers and
parliamentarians are not above attending and delivering speeches at
religious events.
The government has also expressed concern that if one religious
261. Id., at para. 5.
262. Id., at para 6.
263. Id., at paras. 5-8.
264. The Annex singled out the "fiery sermon" of one Rick Seaward of Calvary
Charismatic Church who in August 1987 stated that "the greatest threat to
Christianity... to all mankind today is not Communism but Islam": id, para 7.
265. Bilveer Singh, Whither PAP's Dominance? An Analysis of Singapore's 1991
General Elections (Malaysia: Pelanduk Publications, 1992) at 82; Sue-Ann Chia, 'SDP: No
appeals to race, religion', Straits Times (Singapore) 10 Oct 2001 at H2.
266. 'Kan Seng: Jufrie used Islamic phrases to stir Muslim sentiments' Straits Times
(Singapore), 6 Sept 1991 at 394.
267. Jufrie used Islamic terms to gain political support: PM', Straits Times (Singapore)
14 Sept 1991 at 1
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groups ventures into politics, others will follow suit and political
parties will curry religious favour, causing social disharmony 68 It
advocated that religious groups and their leaders not promote a
politician or political cause under the cloak of religion, although
democratic participation was permissible in their capacity as
269individual citizens. It differentiated Singapore, which has no
established church, from countries with an established religion where
religious leaders play more active political roles, e.g. the Buddhist
Sangha in Sri Lanka and Thailand. Being more heterogeneous in
religious composition, the government considers that "mutual
abstention from competitive political influence" was integral to
religious harmony.27°
As exemplars of mixing religion and politics, the Internal
Security Department (ISD) Security Trends paper enumerated
various examples where Catholic priests had ventured into "social
action." 27' This included publishing political booklets criticizing the
government on secular issues such as the role of multi-national
corporations in Singapore, the emasculation of worker's rights and
trade unions, amendments to citizenship laws and stringent media
laws.272 Several Catholic priests in response to the May 1987
detention of the so-called Marxist Conspirators "issued inflammatory
statements" and "misrepresented the arrests as an attack on the
Church, 2 73 requiring the intervention of the Prime Minister to defuse
the ensuing tension, by getting the Archbishop to publicly state the
arrests were unrelated to the Church.274 What constitutes a political
issue in a sermon includes preaching that the ISA detainees were
"victims of injustice, lies and untruths," 275 were wrongfully detained
and that the relevant government officials "would face God's
268. "Religious groups must not get themselves involved in the political process.
Conversely, no group can be allowed to exploit religious issues or manipulate religious
organisations, whether to excite disaffection or to win political support. It does not matter
if the purpose of these actions is to achieve religious ideals or to promote secular
objectives. In a multi-religious society, if one group violates this taboo, others will follow
suit, and the outcome will be militancy and conflict." President's Address, Opening of
Parliament, 9 January 1989, MRHA white paper, supra, note 26 at para. 2.
269. MRHA white paper, supra, note 26 at paras. 19-22.
270. MRHA, white paper, supra, note 26 at para. 28.
271. Annex, MRHA white paper, id., at para. 13.
272. Annex, MRHA white paper, id., at paras. 13-14.
273. Annex, MRHA white paper, id., at para. 15
274. Annex, MRHA white Paper id at para. 15.
275. Annex, MRHA white Paper, id, at paras. 16-18.
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punishment. 2 76 Foreign Muslim theologians who have incited local
Malay Muslims against the government have been banned from
Singapore. Their talks related to the lack of unity among Muslims
which resulted in the demolition of mosques and the need for
Muslims to be more militant and united in their stand against the
majority Chinese race. They have asserted "that Singapore belonged
to the Malays as they were natives of the island", 277 chiding the
passivity of Malays in failing to convert Chinese immigrants "so that
the Chinese had taken over power from the Muslims.
2 78
4. Religion and Subversion
The government also considered the so-called Marxist conspiracy
of the late 1980s an attempt to subvert the state through radical social
activism, in part through alleged infiltration of Catholic organizations.
Some 22 people were arrested under the Internal Security Act which
authorizes preventive detention for a renewable period of 2 years.279
The basis for the detention order was the alleged involvement of
these social activists in what was characterized as a clandestine,
communist subversive network designed to overthrow the state.
Close connections with the Catholic Church were identified and one
lay worker, Vincent Cheng, was accused of being the principal
conspirator2° in Singapore, acting according to the activist tenets of a
Liberation Theology which originated in South America, which had
inspired the radical Catholicism that led to the ousting of Philippines
dictator Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. Thus, the harsh action against the
alleged conspirators was motivated by the fear that religious groups
engaged in social activism posed a powerful countervailing challenge
to political authority. There was no broad consensus about the
necessity of detention and some detainees gave harrowing accounts of
maltreatment in detention.21
276. Id.
277. Annex, MRHA white Paper, id, at paras 20-24.
278. Id.
279. Section 8, Internal Security Act (Cap 143), 1985 Revised Edition.
280. Cheng was accused of coordinating various groups including the National
University of Singapore Catholic Students' Society, the Catholic Church Justice and Peace
Commission and a Catholic Welfare Centre which managed a maid refuge centre. The
conspiracy allegedly penetrated the opposition Worker's Party and Law Society as well.
See Michael Hill, supra note 139 at 349.
281. See Francis Seow, To Catch a Tartar: A Dissident in Lee Kuan Yew's Prison
(1994). See also Michael Hill, 'Conversion and Subversion: Religion and the Management
of Moral Panics in Singapore' Asia Studies Institute, available at 281.See Francis Seow, To
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Interestingly, the commissioned Academic report which was
published around the time of the Marxist conspiracy in 1988 noted
that the increased involvement of religious groups in social activism
was an "emergent problem ' '2' as zealous believers extended "their
interest and activities beyond the domain which has been
conventionally defined as religious." The report in relation to
Christian group involvement in social welfare service noted that "the
distinction between social concern and on welfare services" 28 and
"politically oriented social actions to redress perceived social
injustice" was "extremely thin." 2m It cautioned that "Religious and
religiously oriented activities could develop into a political activist
movement" such that religion would encroach upon the political
arena, stating that this called for "careful monitoring and handling."' 5
Thus, it echoed the government's views and concerns.
In the aftermath of the 'Marxist Conspiracy,' the government
adopted the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act to pre-emptively
deal with threats to religious harmony by demarcating the sphere of
'religion' and 'politics' to prevent the former from trespassing on the
latter (though not vice versa). The Law Minister S. Jayakumar cited 2
examples to illustrate the types of scenarios the Act would deal with.
First, as referred to in the Prime Minister's National Day Rally of
August 1987, the instance of an Indian Muslim foreign preacher who
urged Muslims in Singapore to be less complacent and more militant
given their failures to increase the numbers of Chinese converts to
Islam; he also disparaged Christianity as a "foolish religion.'
'26
Second, a Catholic priest on the second anniversary of the ISA arrests
of apparent Marxist conspirators had asked his congregation to pray
for the detainees and had declared that "the Minister for Home
Affairs Jayakumar, all Judges and ISD officers would face God's
punishment for this matter." Jayakumar considered it a "grave
concern" 28 that religious leaders would invoke religious authority to
invoke feelings against state authorities and "to invoke the divine
Catch a Tartar: A Dissident in Lee Kuan Yew's Prison (1994). See also Michael Hill,
'Conversion and Subversion: Religion and the Management of Moral Panics in Singapore'
Asia Studies Institute, available at
http://www.vuw.ac.nz/asianstudies/publications/working/conversion.html
282 Religious Revivalism report, supra note 141 at 31.
283. Religion and Religious Revivalism in Singapore, id.,at 31.
284. Id..
285. Id..
286. Minister S Jayakumar 54 Singapore Parliament Reports, 6 Oct 1989 at col 636
287. Minister S Jayakumar id., at col 637.
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power of damnation upon secular authorities.
288
The exploitation of Religion by subversive elements was also
highlighted in the ISD paper. The example of Vincent Cheng and the
Marxist Conspiracy was brought up alleging that Cheng sought to
build up grassroots links as pressure groups to confront the
government, through organising talks to urge revolutionary change.
Also indicted was the Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood) which sought to
gain recruits from pre-university and university students through
religious discussion groups, intending ultimately to implement Islamic
law similar to that of Saudi Arabia or Iran, with resort to armed
uprising as a possible means of action. 89
5. The Malay / Muslim Community and the Question of Loyalty
The issue of the loyalty of Malay-Muslims 290 to Singapore was
heightened in the late 1980s, precipitated by the visit of Israeli Prime
Minister Chaim Herzog to Singapore in 1986, which displeased the
Malay community and indeed, Malaysia, which refuses to recognise
Israel. Israel had helped to build and train Singapore's military forces
since Independence.2 91  Shortly thereafter, the issue surfaced
domestically in 1987 when Minister Lee Hsien Loong replied to a
question why there were no Malay pilots in the Singapore Armed
Forces thus: "....if the SAF is called upon to defend the homeland, we
don't want to put any of our soldiers in a difficult position where his
emotions for the nation may come in conflict with his emotions for his
religion.... In 1999, Senior Minister (SM) Lee Kuan Yew had
remarked that the SAF needed to check the background of a very
religious Malay-Muslim officer before putting him in charge of a
293 imachine gun unit. These issues and others were discussed in a frank
dialogue with the Malay community in 2001, where SM Lee stated
288. Id.
289. Annex, MRHA white paper, supra, note 26 at paras. 32-35. Five Ikhwan leaders
have been arrested under the ISA with the government assuring the Malay community
that the arrests were targeted not at Islam but individuals seeking to subvert the state: KE
Kuah, 'Maintaining ethno-religious harmony in Singapore' Journal of Contemporary Asia,
3 Jan 1998
290. On the treatment of Malays as a minority, see Lily Zubaidah Rahim, 'Minorities
and the State in Malaysia and Singapore: Provisions, Predicaments and Prospects',
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2003/WP.12, UN Working Group on Minorities 9" Sess., 12-16 May
2003.
291. Michael Hill, supra, note 139 at 349.
292. Straits Times, 18 March 1987, quoted in Michael Hill, supra, note 139 at 349.
293. '100 Malays for dialogue with SM today' Straits Times (Singapore) 2 March 2001,
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that the criterion of race and religion was still a consideration with
respect to employment in the security services.294 At the inception of
national service in 1967 when race relations were still tenuous, the
government did not recruit all young Malays to do military training
run by Israeli instructors at a time of Muslim-Israeli conflict. Since
the 1980s, all Singaporean males are called up for national service,
whether they were deployed in the Singapore Armed Forces, police
or civil defence. SM Lee candidly noted that factors in deciding the
posting of NS men included the sensitivity of the post and the racial
and religious mix of the units.295 Thus, the perception of the problem
of Malay integration in Singapore society persists.
6. Religious Extremism, Terrorism and Threats against State Security
Singapore has faced the twin threats of Communism and
Communalism since its inception. While Communism is a spent force
in a post Cold War landscape, communalism in the form of ethnic
unrest and religious tension remains a major concern. The present
incarnation of this threat is in the form of religious extremism, most
recently embodied in the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) bomb threat.
The JI is a terrorist group which has links with Al Qaeda. Their
objective is to establish by violent means a pan-Islamic state or
Daulah Islamiyah, transcending the borders of Southeast Asian
countries like Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines and
Brunei. In December 2001, their plan to bomb certain strategic
locations including the US embassy and the Yishun Mass Rapid
Transportation station was uncovered, resulting in the arrest of some
15 persons, with another 21 arrested in August 2002 by the Internal
Security Department. This exacerbated ethnic relations as these men
were Malay Muslim and in Singapore, the vast majority of Malays are
Muslim which make ethnicity and faith virtually synonymous.296
These "radical self-proclaimed Islamic groups in Southeast Asia"
threaten the cohesion of Singapore society as these groups "exploit
the teachings of Islam to justify their actions;" hence, "any acts of
violence that they perpetrate will inevitably undermine inter-ethnic
294. 'Integration has brought benefits to all': SM's Dialogue with the Malay
Community' Straits Times (Singapore), 4 March 2001, at 34.
295. Id.,
296. But note that the Muslim Community is not homogenous: up to 9% are Indian by
ethnic origin and have different cultural and linguistic traditions from the majority Malay
Muslims: Religious revivalism report, supra note 141 at 7.
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trust and unravel the general communal harmony and peace that
Singaporeans enjoy today.''297 Thus, terrorism in the name of religion
poses a grave threat to Singapore's social fabric.
Aside from deploying the weight of preventive detention laws on
the JI members, the government released a white paper in January
2003 which sought to explain the rationale and basis for their action.298
Through meetings with community leaders, the government tried to
diffuse ethnic-religious tension and heightened suspicions towards
Muslims. The white paper frankly noted that while the terrorist
threats affect all Singaporeans alike, whether Muslim or non-Muslim,
an effect of the discovered threat was to elicit "divisive misgivings"
and suspicions" as "some Muslims worry that these developments
have caused non-Muslims to view them with distrust and suspicion,"
owing to a perception of increased radicalism within the Muslim
community. 2 9 The government emphasised that JI members were a
"small and isolated group of misguided Muslims with no support from
the community" and that the "vast majority of Singaporean Muslims
are moderate, tolerant and law-abiding and do not support the
actions of Muslim militants."" The government sought to pro-
actively engage the Muslim community to develop "a comprehensive
self-regulatory system to monitor religious education" so as to detect
"dangerous extremist teachings." 301 In placatory terms, it recognized
that in rooting out radical teachers and terrorists, it "must not disrupt
the legitimate practices and peaceful activities of the local Muslim
community." 2
Thus, the government took a lead role in trying to debunk
harmful stereotypes. In realizing the limits of a legislative or 'top
down' institutionalised approach towards managing religious
harmony, the government has sought to engage individual and
community grassroots involvement in building up relationships
between the races and religions, e.g. through initiatives like the Inter-
Racial Confidence Circles established in January 2002, to provide a
forum where community and religious leaders could engage in inter-
297. The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism, white paper (Cmd. 2
of 2003, Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs) at 2 [JI white paper], available at the
website of the Ministry for Home Affairs, at http://www2.mha.gov.sg/mha/index.jsp.
298. Id.
299. Id., at 23.
300. Id., at 23.
301. Id., at 22.
302. Id., at 22.
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303faith dialogue, confidence-building, relationship forging activities.
This would prevent a community from retreating into its own
parochial shell.
7. Where Religious Tenets Clash with Government Policy: In the Army
Where religious tenets, like pacifism or conscientious objection
are seen as threats to general laws and public policy, like compulsory
military service, secular imperatives trump sacred dictates, with the
courts displaying sympathy towards government concerns. For
example in the leading 1994 High Court decision of Colin Chan v PP,
Yong CJ noted the statement of concern in the affidavit of the
Assistant Director of Manpower of the Ministry of Defence that the
morale of the Singapore Armed Forces would be undermined by the
wilful disobedience by Jehovah Witnesses (JWs) of orders to put on a
military uniform.3 Furthermore, if not punished, JWs would "enjoy
the social and economic benefits of Singapore citizenship and
permanent residence" 305 without bearing the "responsibility of
defending the very social and political institutions" 301 which enable
them to do so.307 Great weight was accorded to the state's perspective
over the religious liberty issues and the paramountcy of security
objectives. Under the Societies Act, a group can be deregistered
where it is considered to be "prejudicial to public peace, welfare or
good order in Singapore. ''308 The Chief Justice approved the pre-
emptive nature of the act of dissolving the Congregation of the
Jehovah Witnesses, for fear that their pacifist stance would threaten
the public order, without evaluating the likelihood or possibility of
such occurrence. There was no need to show that the exercise of a
religious liberty presented a 'clear and present danger' before a state
could restrict a religious practice as "any administration which
perceives the possibility of trouble over religious beliefs and yet
prefers to wait until trouble is just about to break out before taking
action must not be only be pathetically naive but also grossly
303. 'Bringing potential racial tiffs under control; Despite receiving criticism, Inter-
Racial Confidence Circles show they have played a role in defusing tension around
S'pore', Straits Times (Singapore) 5 April 2005, available on LEXIS.
304. [1994] 3 SLR 662 at 684G-I.
305. (1994) 3 SLR 662 at 684H-I.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Section 24(1), Societies Act (Cap 311), 1985 Revised Edition.
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incompetent."309
This means that the state may conclusively determine what
matters fall within the province of the 'secular' which is subject to
legal regulation:
Jehovah's Witnesses believe that their religion forbids
them to do any form of National Service. Under the law,
this is criminal conduct, not conscientious objection.
Followers of this sect who refuse to obey call-up orders
are court-martialled and serve jail sentences.3 °
Thus, JWs who refuse to perform military service are not granted
exemptions from the general law of the land, in contrast with the
exemptions granted under the Administration of Muslim Law Act
(Cap 3) in relation to Muslim personal and religious law. While the
division between religion and politics "is a matter of convention,, 311 it
is the government that determines convention
8. Where Religious Tenets Clash with Government Policy: In the Schools
The state controls religious expression in public school, as
,311 hevident in the 2002 'tudung controversy, which the New York
Times described as involving "the most potent act of civil
disobedience" Singapore had witnessed for years.313 It involved a
tussle between asserted rights of religious freedom and an
educational policy directive mandating that only uniforms be worn in
public school, to serve the purposes of maintaining school discipline,
preserving the secular multi-ethnic character of schools and to
promote a common identity among school children.
The government views educational institutions as forums for
socialising citizens into its vision of ethnic management through
national integration, with the desired goal of communal harmony.314
Pursuant to this, the rationale underlying a school uniforms policy
was to maintain a common domain where students can interact
309. (1994) 3 SLR 662 at 683D.
310. MRHA white paper, supra, note 26, page 7, section 26b.
311. MRHA white Paper, supra, note 26 page 5, section 24.
312. Thio Li-ann, 'Recent Constitutional Developments: Of Shadows and Whips,
Race, Rifts and Rights, Terror and Tudungs, Women and Wrongs' Singapore Journal of
Legal Studies 328-373 (2002). See also Kam-yee Law, 'Civic Disobedience of Malay
Muslims in Post September 11'h Singapore' in Development, 46(1), 107-111 (March 2003).
313. Seth Mydans, 'By Barring Religious Garb, Singapore School Dress Code
Alienates Muslims', New York Times, 2 March 2002, Section A, Column 1 at page 6.
314. For a contrary view on how government 'integrationist' policy has actually
institutionalised ethnic and cultural differences, see Suzaina Kadir, supra, note 122.
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without consciousness of difference. This was challenged by
demands, accelerating since the 1990s,315 by parents at dialogue
sessions with government ministers that their daughters be allowed to
wear the headscarf as an expression of religious identity.
In January 2003, there was open defiance of government policy
when four Muslim primary schoolgirls were suspended from
attending school for as long as they choose not to comply with the 'no
tudung' uniforms policy. Their parents argued that this violated their
constitutional rights of religious freedom as it was their view that
Islam mandates such dress as a matter of modesty. No issues of
gender inequality"6 or feminist critique37 were publicly canvassed,
that a 'no tudung' policy liberates female Muslims from a repressive
patriarchal practice. Furthermore, it must be noted that Sikh boys
were allowed to wear turbans to schools. Government ministers
justified this on pragmatic grounds, on the basis that this practice
historically dated back to colonial times. In calling for compromise
and accommodation, Minister Lim Boon Heng pointed out that even
Sikhs compromised insofar as they were not allowed to carry, as their
religion required, a dagger (kirpan) but instead carried a dagger-
shaped comb."8 In advocating a pragmatic 'give and take' attitude,
the government downplayed the rights issue - that the article 12
equality clause might impugn this discriminatory practice.
In the face of potential litigation with the aid of a Malaysian
lawyer,"' accompanied by critical Malaysian politicians claiming a
spiritual protectorate of sorts over Singapore Malay Muslims,"'
315. 'Time is not right for Islamic attire in national schools', Straits Times (Singapore),
8 May 2000, available on LEXIS ; Suzaina Kadir, supra, note 122 at 15.
316. See Salbiah Ahmad, 'Construction of identity through 'religious dress',
Malaysiakini.com, 7 Feb 2002, available at http://www.singapore-
window.org/sw02/020207mk.htm
317. See Lama Abu-Odeh, 'Post Colonial Feminism and the Veil: Considering the
Differences' 26 New England Law Review 1527 (1992).
318. 'Ministers call for 'give and take' attitude', Straits Times (Singapore), 17 Feb 2002,
available on LEXIS.
319. The lawyer was Kirpal Singh, who was refused an employment pass. See generally
Singapore - The Tudung Affair', From Dateline (Australia TV), 27 March 2002, archived
at http://www.singapore-window.org/sw02/020327sb.htm
320. Malaysian politicians in justifying their intervention in Singapore's internal affairs
stated that "universal elements in Islam have no geographical boundary": PAS leader
writes to SM Lee on Tudung Issue" Straits Times (Singapore) 6 Feb 2002 at A7. See also
"Umno Youth claims right to speak on tudung issue" Straits Times(Singapore)(2 Feb 2002,
available on LEXIS. The PAS political party went so far as to raise money to support any
legal fees incurred which was criticized by other Malaysian political parties: "PAS raises
$4700 for tudung girls" Straits Times (Singapore) (23 May 2002) "KL politicians slam PAS
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official Muslim bodies made statements which did not enjoy universal
consensus within the Muslim community. 31  MUIS and the Mufti,
Singapore's highest Muslim religious authority, stated that Islam
valued education over issues associated with wearing the headscarf
relating to the aurat (parts of the body which could be seen in public),
in the event of a clash,322 stressing it was unclear that Islam required
that a pre-adolescent girl wear the Muslim headscarf 3  Critics feel
the fact that the Mufti took the position he did was indicative of his
weak position, and further, that the close relation MUIS had with the
government, compounded by the assertion that Malay Muslim MPs
speak out for party interests, not for the Malay community, meant
that other Muslim voices went unheeded. If so, then the state is able
to modulate if not regulate the views expressed by the chief religious
authorities in the land, and thus stamp the supremacy of its objectives
which constrain the autonomous expression of religious perspectives.
The tudung case never went to court; nevertheless, it appears that
national goals limit the exercise of civil liberties, including religious
liberties.324 In the aftermath of 9-11 and the discovered JI bomb plot,
with the Muslim community sensitive to receiving negative media
publicity, the government was concerned this issue might heighten
religious consciousness and unify even moderate Muslims in opposition
to what might be seen as the marginalisation of religious and cultural
identity. It was feared that allowing religious clothing in schools would
accentuate racial and religious differences and elicit competing
demands from other communities. Nevertheless, the government
indicated that this policy was not set in stone and could change as
Singapore matured into a "successful multi-racial society.
32
1
for exploiting tudung issue', Straits Times(Singapore) (24 May 2002), available on LEXIS.
321. The Singapore Islamic Scholars and Religious Teachers Association (PERGAS)
maintained that wearing the hijab was compulsory: The English translation of the Pergas
stand on the Hijab issue is available at http://www.pergas.org.sg/hijab-press2eng.html. See
Suzaina Kadir, supra, note 115 at 15 and Chua Lee Hoong, 'Tudung controversy a test in
art of negotiation', Straits Times(Singapore), 20 Feb 2002, available on LEXIS.
322. 'Mufti puts school first', Straits Times (Singapore) ,6 Feb 2002, available on
LEXIS.
323. Karamah (Muslim Women Lawyers for Human Rights) argued the Mufti was
acting on the Islamic principle of choosing the lesser of 2 evils, opting for education over
wearing a tudung but asserted that the government's capitalization on this fatwa to justify
its discriminatory practices was "reprehensible": Letter to Singapore Ambassador Heng
Chee Chan, 20 April 2002, available at http://www.karamah.org/press-letterto
_singapore.htm (visited 20 Feb 2005).
324. See Thio Li-ann, supra, note 315 at 355-366.
325. 'Time is not right for Islamic attire in national schools', Straits Times (Singapore),
8 May 2000, available on LEXIS.
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Critics argued that visible expression of religious differences
promote familiarity and respect for differences, stating that the
Singapore policy heralded "a new attitude of hostility towards
religious diversity," and portended a shift towards further "internal
political hegemony" which sacrificed minority interests on the altar of
statist concerns. 2 6  KARAMAH, a US-based Muslim women's
lawyers group argued that measures to protect integration at the
expense of the constitutional rights of minorities harked back to "an
age of hegemony" where the enforced homogenization of a diverse
population was a deployed tactic of social control. Thus not only was
the Singapore policy intolerant and unconstitutional, "its historical
and civilizational premises are obsolete," in an age where diversity
was celebrated.3 "
True to the Singapore ethos of social engineering, the official
stance was that while diversity in Singapore was a fact, it was
uncertain whether diversity would promote greater unity or
separateness. Hence, it was important that "critical institutions" like
schools serve as key pillars in the task of forging social cohesion since
it was unwise to leave things "to chance or natural forces. 3 28 The
rationale of the ban was characterized as an attempt to remove
displays of religiosity from public schools in an attempt to preserve
Singapore's "secular ethos" 329 after a secularism portrayed as
intolerant and homogenizing and inimical to "genuine pluralism."
Critics have argued that the tudung policy represents an attempt by
the PAP government "to impose cultural and social conformity in
schools" exposing its "religious insensitivity," an expression of
"secular fundamentalism.""
Thus, the fate of the Muslim religious minority is similar to that
326. The local association of Islamic scholars and religious teachers, PERGAS, also
disagreed and felt wearing the tudung was no obstacle to national integration, being an
aspect of modest dressing as required by Islam, there being a need for greater
understanding of Muslims' religious needs from both government and citizens: Ahmad
Osman, G Sivakkumaran, 'Common uniform policy strengthens national unity; Govt
should not be too hasty to change uniform policy as it helps foster integration says Yaacob
Ibrahim', Straits Times (Singapore), 9 Feb 2002, available on LEXIS..
327. Karamah Letter, supra, note 326.
328. Lim Chee Hwee, Press Secretary to the Minister for Education, 'Uniform reminds
students of common ties', Straits Times (Singapore), 2 Feb 2002, Forum, available on
LEXIS..
329. 'Tudung's a mark of difference, not subversion', New Straits Times (Malaysia) 5
Feb 2002 at 10.
330. Rahim, 'Minorities and the State in Malaysia and Singapore', supra, note 292 at
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of the Jehovah's Witnesses, where their rights to religious expression
in schools are subject to the primacy of statist objectives. As Tan Lee
Meng J noted in Peter Williams Nappalli v Institute of Technical
Education, involving the dismissal of a teacher for refusing to
participate in flag saluting ceremonies, while state interests and the
religious beliefs of the plaintiff had to be carefully balanced so as to
give individuals the full measure of their fundamental liberties, "this
is one case where the interest of the State in the education system
must prevail over those of the individual., 31' Thus, the courts defer to
state objectives and manifest a communitarian approach to
adjudicating constitutional rights, and religious liberty rights are
curtailed through a broad construction of the qualifications clause.
I. Conclusions
The theme of managing religious harmony in the interests of
state stability and prosperity is likely to remain a dominant one in
Singapore's political discourse. As Home Affairs Minister Wong Kan
Seng noted in 2003:
Strengthening our social cohesion and religious harmony is a
fundamental and on-going enterprise in our nation-building which
preceded the terrorist threat and which will continue after this is
over.
332
In Singapore, where Religion can bolster or facilitate state
programs, it is co-opted. It is fair to say that the model of State-
Religion relations in Singapore is generally more co-operationist than
separationist in nature.33 There is no strict separation of 'Church
(Religion) and State' in Singapore; as such, terms like 'quasi-secular'
and 'accommodative secularism' are apt descriptions of the Singapore
context. This reflects the pragmatic nature of the continuing
experiment in managing religious pluralism and state objectives in
Singapore. Nevertheless, government pragmatism has its limits and
official policy holds that religion and politics must not mix, which
means communities can pursue religious interests with the caveat that
331. [1998] SGHC 351 para. 53 (High Court, Singapore).
332. 'Balancing needs of faith and citizenship; Minister tells Parliament that each
community can pursue its interests as long as political cohesion is not harmed', Straits
Times (Singapore) 23 Jan 2003, available on LEXIS.
333. The government must not be 'antagonistic' towards religion but 'neutral', not
preferring any religious groups; it must ensure individual are able to choose their own
faith and that religious freedoms do not infringe the rights and sensitivities of other
citizens: MRHA white paper, supra, note 26 at para 5.
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the "political cohesion at the centre" 334 must not be threatened.
Religion is controlled or limited where it is seen to be a threat to the
secularly couched objectives of the state in terms of security and
preserving racial and religious harmony, or national policy. It is left
to flourish where it is confined to the realms of private spirituality,
celebrated as an aspect of cultural identity and source of traditional
values or where it operates in the innocuous realm of civic-
mindedness and ministers to social needs. Ultimately, the State
reserves to itself the right to define religion and the sphere of
legitimate religious activity. While religious diversity is an aspect of
pluralism, a government minister has noted in general that "our
capacity to accommodate diversity and differences is directly tied to
the strength of our common values and beliefs. If we do not have
these anchor points as a people, then diversity may well tear us
apart." '335 The limits of multiculturalism are tied to the preservation of
a national value system, which stresses 'racial and religious harmony',
as articulated by the government.
While religious liberty is broadly enjoyed in Singapore, at least
for the mainstream religious groups, and while religion is afforded a
role in public life, ultimately, Religion is subordinated to government
priorities and imperatives, within a dominant political culture which
has been defined as embodying "paternalism, communitarianism,
pragmatism and secularism." '336
334. 'Balancing needs of faith and citizenship; Minister tells Parliament that each
community can pursue its interests as long as political cohesion is not harmed' Straits
Times (Singapore), 23 Jan 2003 (Minister Wong Kan Seng in parliamentary debates over
the Jemaah Islamiyah white paper), available on LEXIS
335. Raymond Lim, 'Thoughts on getting 'people climate right', Straits Times
(Singapore), Review, 18 July 2005, available on LEXIS.
336. Eddie Kuo, 'Confucianism as Political Discourse in Singapore: the Case of an
Incomplete Revitalization Movement', in Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity:
Moral Education and Economic Culture in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons 304, 307
(W.M. Tu ed., Harvard University Press, 1996).
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